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ABSTRACT
Clampit, Jack Alan. PhD. The University of Memphis. August, 2013. Does
Institutional Misalignment Prompt Escape-Based Internationalization? An Exploratory
Study of Latin American Outbound Foreign Direct Investment.
The international business literature offers four primary reasons for firms moving
parts of their value chain abroad: they desire access to markets, resources, efficiencies, or
strategic assets. Despite suggestions by prominent scholars (e.g., Dunning) that there may
be a fifth motive – the desire to escape from institutional settings that hinder a firm’s
ability to achieve its goals – convincing evidence in support of this motive has been
elusive.
Current studies of escape-based internationalization tend to come from adjacent
disciplines, and are usually conceptual in nature (thus providing no empirical support) or
are qualitative, survey-based examinations (thus limiting generalizability and potentially
over-relying on stated, versus revealed, preferences). Moreover, quantitative, empirical
studies that do exist typically fail to control for the big four traditional motives (i.e., they
examine covariates, control for non-motivational confounds, and then assume escape has
occurred).
In hopes of providing persuasive evidence in support of this fifth motive, I
combine a natural experiment-based research design (to help control for omitted variables
and reverse-causality) with predictions derived from behavioral decision-making theory
(to disentangle traditional from escape-based motives). This allows me to provide
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quantitative, empirical evidence that accounts for traditional motives and is based on
realized, as opposed to stated, preferences.
I found that predicted relationship directions equaled actual directions for 24
hypotheses (18 were statistically significant) versus four where predicted and actual
directions diverged (two were statistically significant). I thus conclude that escape-based
internationalization does happen, with higher degrees of home-country institutional
deterioration prompting quicker and more aggressive foreign investments.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
One of the most cherished constructs in international business is distance; not
literal, linear geographical distance, but distance as a metaphor (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999)
depicting bilaterally heterogeneous norms, values, or rules. A common, unifying theme
within this literature is the assumption that distance increases the liability of foreignness
experienced by firms (Bae & Saloman, 2010; Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995), and in doing
so, negatively affects performance (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Evans & Mavondo, 2002;
Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Thus, distance is also
presumed to affect firm conduct, in a preemptive bid to prevent poor performance (e.g.,
Brouthers, 2002; Contractor & Kundu, 1998; Perkins, 2009; Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2004).
These assumptions often seem taken for granted, as scholars continuously
consider its impact on the strategies, actions, and performance of multinational
enterprises at the individual, industry, country or regional levels. For example, five
seminal papers alone – Johanson and Vahlne (1977), Johanson and Vahlne (1990), Kogut
and Singh (1988), Kostova (1999), and Kostova and Zaheer (1999) – have been cited
over 11,000 times (Google Scholar, 2013). Considering the thousands of additional
papers employing the distance metaphor in one fashion or another, one can easily see
how important the field considers this construct to be.
In the tradition of Murray Davis (Davis, 1971), however, I choose to examine an
interesting conundrum. Despite the widespread prominence of the distance construct
within international business, there is a potential white elephant in a room, a possible fly
in the proverbial ointment: empirical support for the theory that distance negatively
affects firms is not as strong as the theory’s dominance would suggest (e.g., Tihanyi,
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Griffith, & Russell's 2005 meta-analysis). I propose that we do not find the
overwhelming evidence we predict because it does not exist. I do not suggest that no
evidence exists; this is obviously not true. I simply suggest that the preponderance of
evidence is mixed, as while distance may negatively affect firm performance and (in
preemptive bids to avoid reduced performance) conduct, its effects may also be neutral
or, in some cases, even complementary.
Thus, expanding Shenkar's (2001) critique of cultural distance to the broader
domain of institutional distance, I examine the claim that distance is only problematic
when it causes friction, and thus suggest that scholars shift their focus from the distance
between home and host countries to misalignments between institutions and multinational
enterprise goals. In order to determine the validity of this claim, scholars must examine
the effects of institutional misalignment (institutional misalignment) on firm conduct and
performance.
The first step, and the specific goal of this dissertation, is to offer a preliminary
test of the former by examining internationalization decisions by Latin American
multinational enterprises experiencing institutional misalignment within their respective
home countries. To do so, I combine a natural experiment based research design with a
partial least squares model. The research design, rather than statistical methods, is the
primary means of controlling for omitted variable bias, reverse causality, and temporal
covariates (e.g., internationalization has tended to increase over the years). Predictions
based on the behavioral decision making heuristics literature (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) help delineate between traditional internationalization motives (based on the
prospect for potential gain) and my proposed institutional misalignment-based motives
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(whereby institutional misalignment at home prompts multinational enterprises to move
parts of their value chain abroad in an attempt to avoid loss). Partial least squares helps
me simultaneously test multiple dependent variables related to degrees of institutional
change and various characteristics related to multinational enterprise internationalization
activity that may be affected by institutional misalignment.
I hope to contribute to the literature by: (1) helping to shift the institutions
discussion towards institutional misalignment-based examination, (2) showing that home
country factors (as opposed to host country attributes) are relevant when examining
multinational enterprise internationalization, (3) providing quantitative empirical
evidence that escape is a genuine internationalization motive, in a manner that controls
for traditional internationalization motives, (4) examining – in accordance with Brouthers
(2013) suggestions for future institutions research – institutional effects of managerial
decision making via a holistic consideration of multiple institutions within the same study
(rather than single institutions at a time), and (5) offering compelling, quantitative
empirical evidence in support of adding a fifth FDI motive – escape-based FDI – to the
four traditional FDI motives.
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
In order to make a compelling case that institutional misalignment affects
decisions to internationalize, I must first show that institutions matter. Thus, I begin by
reviewing literature related to institutions and multinational enterprises. I then offer
evidence that the desire for multinational enterprises to escape from home markets
characterized by institutional misalignment is one worth considering. I do this primarily
by offering real world examples and a logical explanation for why escape might occur, in
conjunction with a review of the many scholarly papers on escape-based
internationalization. This literature is dominated by qualitative evidence, primarily
because of a central testing issue: When firms decide to go abroad, how do researchers
separate escape from traditional gain-seeking motives (Witt & Lewin, 2007)? As I claim
that the employment of a behavioral decision-making lens may help us disentangle the
two motives and, thus, tease out escape-based effects, I next offer evidence that
behavioral heuristics: (1) affect decision making, (2) within firms, and (3) with respect to
internationalization decisions in particular. Once the logic and literature I offer
establishes that institutional misalignment may, indeed, drive escape, and that a
behavioral decision making lens is a suitable one to adopt, I offer specific details
regarding the empirical test I plan to conduct (e.g., proposed methods, variables, etc.).
Institutions
Institutional Theory Overview
North (1990) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that
structure human interaction”, and says they consist of the “formal constraints (rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed
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codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics”; they are “the rules of the
game”, so to speak, that dictate a society’s incentive structure (3). Examples include
legal institutions that formally regulate behavior in a society, financial institutions such as
those making up a country’s capital markets, and informal institutions such as currently
popular moral norms, e.g., a population collectively viewing firms that promote
environmental sustainability in a positive light while disapproving of firms that pollute.
The exacting precision of their mathematical models notwithstanding,
neoclassical economists often assume a frictionless and static business environment
where transactions are free, and the strategies of firms relatively unconstrained by
institutional forces (North, 1981). In reality, transactions have very real costs, costs that
are often magnified when operating abroad, e.g., negotiation costs, the costs of writing
and enforcing contracts for each transaction, etc. (Coase, 1937; Wallace & North, 1986;
Williamson, 1981). These costs, as well as the set of strategic choices available to firms,
are directly influenced and/or constrained by the institutional framework within which
firms operate (Alston, Eggertsson, & North, 1996; Bruton, Dess, & Janney, 2007; Bueno
de Mesquita & Root, 2000; Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007; North, 1990; Wan & Hoskisson,
2003).
Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright (2000), and Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008),
thus, explicitly note the importance of institutions to scholars studying multinational
enterprises, with Peng et al. (2008) imploring scholars to explicitly account for
institutions via a three legged stool metaphor, with resource, industry, and institutional
based views of the firm as legs. In other words, while resource and industry factors are
vital, institutional factors deserve a clear place at the table too. Accordingly, recent
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research does suggest that institutions – in categories related to the conducting of
business, such as regulatory or tax burdens, labor market rigidities, rule of law, property
rights and corruption (but not in categories related to democratic rights of citizens to
select or critique government officials) – do affect multinational enterprise
internationalization decisions, especially with respect to entry mode (e.g., foreign direct
investment) and location choice (Dewit, Görg, & Montagna, 2009; Globerman &
Shapiro, 2002a, b; Grosse & Trevino, 2005; Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005; Kostova, Roth,
& Dacin, 2008; Stein & Daude, 2001; Trevino, Thomas, & Cullen, 2008; Wei, 2000).
Heterogeneous, Non-ergodic Settings
The concept of escape from one institutional environment to another also implies
that institutional settings differ. In other words, there must be some place for firms to
escape to. Indeed, settings do differ, e.g. the case of “transition” economies, where the
very word “transition” refers to the transformation from one institutional configuration,
such as communism or socialism, to another. Furthermore, differences do not only exist
between extreme institutional settings along the lines of communism versus capitalism.
Drawing on research streams from political science and socioeconomics, various studies
suggest the existence of multiple varieties of capitalism, based on heterogeneous
institutional configurations resulting from different histories, cultures, and goals (Albert,
1993; Chandler, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Redding, 2005; Wade, 1990; Whitley,
1999). Moreover, not only are the institutional matrices different when comparing
nations in different regions, they are also different when comparing firms in the same
region, e.g., Asian countries versus other Asian countries (Orru et al. 1997).
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Another stream of research introduces the constructs of Coordinated Market
Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), where firms either adjust to
environmental changes on their own, with other firms copying the practices of the more
successful firms, resulting in initial heterogeneity but eventual isomorphism, versus
economies where aggregate level change is voluntarily implemented or dictated by labor
unions, governments, etc. (Albert, 1993; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt & Lewin 2007).
This is not the same as centralization or decentralization, where a central authority in a
socialist or communist country, or an authoritarian ruler, makes centralized decisions
versus the decentralized decision making we are used to in the United States. For
example, the U.S. is a decentralized LME while Germany is a fairly centralized CME.
One point to be extracted from this research stream is the idea that CMEs are slow to
adjust, prone to groupthink, and bound to suffer in unison if poor decisions are made.
Witt (2008) thus predicts that as societal coordination increases, institutional
misalignment will increase.
Further evidence of heterogeneous non-ergodic institutional environments comes
from A.T. Kearney’s annual FDI Confidence Index report (2007-2012) that includes the
results of surveys of managers with strategic decision making responsibilities in the
Global 1000 (the 1,000 largest firms in the world based on annual revenues, representing
60 countries, 6 continents, and 17 industries). As always, the FDI Confidence Index
report includes updates of important changes in the institutional environments of various
countries around the globe. Each year's list of changes serves to illustrate that the global
institutional environment is not merely heterogeneous; it is also dynamic and always
changing. (This is an important attribute, as I propose that institutional departures from
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equilibrium may spur FDI activity.) A sampling of institutional changes can be found in
Table 1, which lists some of the more important changes that occurred in 2007.
Institutional Distance
With regard to institutional distance, specifically, I begin by acknowledging
studies that provide evidence in support of the assertion that institutional distance is
important. For example, many studies suggest that institutional distance (with respect to
factors such as those examined above) negatively affects both multinational enterprise
conduct (e.g., Benassy-Quere, Coupet, & Meyer, 2007; Brouthers, 2002; Contractor &
Kundu, 1998; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Xu et al., 2004) and performance (e.g., Chao &
Kumar, 2010; Evans & Mavondo, 2002; Morosini et al., 1998; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).
Offering an example of institutional distance’s potential shortcomings, however,
Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) begin by examining several studies related to entry
mode. They first note that Anand and Delios (1997) and Padmanabhan and Cho (1996)
find a direct relationship between wholly owned entry modes (allowing for maximal
multinational enterprise control) and distance. The logic is straightforward: when firms
are dealing with parties in countries they know little about, opportunities for
opportunistic behavior increase; this results in firms deciding to maximize levels of
control via the internalization of external processes. The problem, as they go on to note,
is that Kogut and Singh (1988) and Erramilli and Rao (1993) found that distance was
related, instead, to shared-control modes of entry. Erramilli (1996) and Gatignon and
Anderson (1988), meanwhile, find no relationship at all between distance and entry mode
for most firms (with the exception of U.S. firms, for which findings were
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Table 1
2007 Institutional Settings Update
Country

Update

Indonesia

While rich in natural resources and possessing the 4th largest
population in the world, Indonesia has had trouble attracting
FDI due to institutionally related issues such as an overburdensome regulatory environment and security concerns,
but is now promising to improve customs rules, labor laws,
taxation levels, property rights, and bureaucracy levels.

Thailand

Thailand dropped completely off the 2007 index due to
political stability concerns after a military coup.

Germany

In response to concerns that businesses were leaving due to
institutional disadvantages, Germany cut corporate taxes from
39% to 30%. “Union wage restraint" is mentioned as another
positive development.

United Kingdom

The U.K., with twice as much IFDI as its closest European
rival, continues to benefit from higher transaction costs
imposed on U.S. markets by Sarbanes-Oxley, due to a more
favorable regulatory environment and skilled workers.

Russia

Respondents noted an improved economy, large markets, and
skilled labor, but more than half decided to pull back or hold
investment constant due to political concerns including the
threat of nationalization, poor rule of law, and crime.

France

Outlook improved due to promised reforms, e.g., education,
labor flexibility; the recent financial crisis, though, seems to
have tempered reform. Protectionism concerns remain.

Africa

Concerns remain the same, with 92% mentioning bureaucracy,
80% citing political instability, 69% citing poor public
infrastructure, and 58% mentioning the poorly skilled
workforce as reasons to avoid Africa.

Source: A.T. Kearney’s 2007 FDI Confidence Index Report
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mixed!). In other words, there is often little consistency with regards to findings, when
statistically significant findings exist at all.
Other scholars provide more troublesome evidence. For example, (Tihanyi et al.,
2005) conducted a meta-analysis consisting of 66 independent samples, with sample sizes
ranging from 2,255 to 24,152. They ultimately concluded that no statistical evidence of
direct relationships exists between informal institutional distance and entry mode choice,
international diversification, and multinational enterprise performance.
Shenkar and colleagues (2001, 2002, 2008, 2012) refer to potential conceptual
and methodological concerns associated with the distance construct, taking issue, for
example, with the assumption that distance is always problematic, the assumption that
distance is constant, and the assumption that perceived distance and its effects are
symmetrical with respect to each involved actor. They thus advise scholars to forego the
artificial precision of neatly quantifiable distances and, instead, focus on friction.
Originally coined by Williamson (1975), friction represents difficulties between
transacting partners. The key point with respect to institutions is that while institutional
distance may cause difficulties and thus create friction, sometimes distance is simply not
a problem.
For example, Dunning (1998) explicitly notes that the ability of firms to identify
and reconcile distance-based differences, or even exploit them, can translate into
competitive advantage. As illustrations of this, Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and
Jayaraman (2009), Park, and Ungson (1997), and Reus and Lamont (2009) find that
increased levels of distance can actually improve the performance of international
mergers and joint ventures, as complementarities and an increased ability to overcome
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cognitive rigidities results in synergy. When distance is a problem, however, friction
exists, and this, rather than simple distance, per se, is what firms should worry about. In
other words, it is a matter of fit, or alignment, more so than distance per se.
Given the conceptual flaws and lack of supporting empirical evidence that
consistently affirms the real-world applicability of the distance construct as currently
used, I thus suggest a shift in focus from studying the effects of distance between home
and host countries, towards studying degrees of alignment or fit between firms,
themselves, and the countries that they operate in. Figure 1 illustrates the directional
effects of institutions that have been adopted by the broader literature. Figure 2,
meanwhile, illustrates my institutional misalignment-based conception of how
institutions affect firms, with degrees of alignment or misalignment between institutions
and what firms are trying to achieve affecting conduct and performance.
Simply poking holes in the universal applicability of the institutional distance
construct, however, is not the same thing as providing convincing evidence that
institutional misalignment is a worthy supplement to institutional distance-based thought.
In order to make a plausible claim that institutional misalignment is also a useful
construct, I must demonstrate its validity as a predictor, i.e., I must first demonstrate that
misalignment actually matters, and that despite its relative neglect by international
business scholars, it is something that is actually important to firms. To do so, I offer an
empirical test of whether or not formal institutional misalignment affects firm conduct.
As the type of conduct I examine is internationalization decisions – more specifically, the
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MNE
Goal

Internationalization
Decisions

Profits (exploit/augment
competitive advantage)
1. Markets
2. Resources
3. Efficiency
4. Strategic Assets

Performance
Outcomes

• Decision to go abroad
• Location Choice (e.g.,
market size, workforce
characteristics, etc.)
• Entry Mode (e.g., new
subsidiary, JV, etc.)

•
•
•
•
•

LOF
Attempt to
reduce LOF
The concept of distance b/w home/host
countries (e.g., formal institutional distance,
cultural distance, etc.) is among the most
prevalent concepts in IB

Institutional
Distance
2

(Flhome - FIhost) +

2

* Example: (EFW1home – EFW1host) + (EFW2home –
2

(IIhome - IIhost)

2

EFW2host) + (EFW3home – EFW3host) + (EFW4home
2

2*

Where, FI = Formal
Institutions and II =
Informal Institutions

2

– EFW4host) + (EFW5home – EFW5host) + (UAhome

Figure 1. Current Theory of Institutional Distance Affecting Firm Conduct and Performance
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Profitability
Speed
Innovation
Strategic Gains
Etc.

MNE
Goal

Internationalization
Decisions

Profits (exploit/augment
competitive advantage)
1. Markets
2. Resources
3. Efficiency
4. Strategic Assets

Performance
Outcomes

• Decision to go abroad
• Location Choice (e.g.,
market size, workforce
characteristics, etc.)
• Entry Mode (e.g., new
subsidiary, JV, etc.)

•
•
•
•
•

Profitability
Speed
Innovation
Strategic Gains
Etc.

friction potential
Institutional Fit

Institutions

• Between goal & institutions (instead of home/
host distance)
• Three states
1. Aligned
2. Neutral
3. Misaligned (friction)

• Formal
• Informal

Figure 2. Proposed Theory of Institutional Misalignment Affecting Firm Conduct and Performance
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decision by multinational enterprises to escape home countries where institutional
misalignment is deemed as a threat to their ability to operate at acceptable levels of
efficiency – the next section provides theoretical and literature-based evidence that
escape responses to institutional misalignment are a genuine phenomenon that is worthy
of further study.
Institutional Misalignment and Escape-Based Internationalization
Figure 3 illustrates various degrees of alignment between the desire of
multinational enterprises to operate efficiently and their institutional settings at home and
abroad, along with typical internationalization motives that I suggest are associated with
each institutional situation. Each of the next four subsections briefly describes a cell in
this figure.
Aligned at Home and Abroad
Much international business literature concerns firms from developed countries
with advanced institutional frameworks expanding into other similarly developed
countries. The OLI (Ownership, Location, and Internalization) framework is the bedrock
of the traditional explanation of the phenomenon of the multinational enterprise’s investment in foreign locations. Early work on the subject was done by Buckley and
Casson (1976), who defined the value of internalization and, thus, the importance of
operating in, rather than simply exporting to, a foreign country. The greater the
perceived net benefits of internalizing foreign operations (and leveraging proprietary
intangible assets), the more likely a firm will be to engage in foreign direct investment.
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HOME

Misaligned

HOST

Aligned

Aligned

Misaligned

Traditional asset
exploitation and/or
augmentation
motives

Escape-based
motives

Compelling
traditional
motives

Familiaritybased motives

Figure 3. Matrix of Institutional Misalignment and OFDI Motivation

Dunning (1981, 1988) is given primary credit for developing the eclectic paradigm of
internationalization, suggesting that a firm must have a source of advantage – ownership
specific, location specific, or internalization specific – available to it to overcome the
inherent costs and disadvantages of competing with domestic rivals in a host country.
The three sources of competitive advantage in this paradigm can be explained as
follows: (1) the firm might have developed proprietary assets, such as brands or
technologies, in its home market which can give it an advantage in the host market (the
“ownership” advantage); (2) the firm might be able to integrate activities across sectors
of the world with very different factor costs and resource costs giving it an advantage in
the host market (the “location” advantage); and (3) the firm might be able to derive an
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advantage from building economies of scale and scope through internalizing activities
spread across many countries (the “internalization” advantage).
Based on this theory, it has been long argued that firms choose to engage in
foreign direct investment only when they believe that they can exploit existing firm
specific competitive advantages abroad (i.e., an asset-exploitation perspective). While
this is commonly accepted as true, more recently, it has been argued (e.g., Almeida,
1996; Chang, 1995; Chen & Chen, 1998; Kogut & Chang, 1991; Shan & Song, 1997)
that firms might engage in foreign direct investment in an effort to protect, increase, or
develop competitive advantages by gaining access to knowledge, resources, and/or
markets in the host country (i.e., an asset-augmentation perspective) that are not available
in the home country. These two perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but
rather it has been argued (Dunning, 2006) that multinational enterprises that engage in
asset-augmentation, would only do so under the belief that it could gain entry or sustain
operations in a host country by exploiting an existing competitive advantage.
Furthermore, ownership advantages can be those developed internally in existing
operations or simply the competency to seek and absorb external assets and knowledge
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dunning, 2006).
There are four commonly accepted motivations for firms to engage in foreign
direct investment: multinational enterprises may seek new customers (market seeking),
lower costs (efficiency seeking), access to inputs of production (asset seeking), or new
capabilities (strategic asset seeking). It is important to note that firms can often have
mixed motives (invest for more than one reason simultaneously), complementary motives
(combine two or more motives to accomplish a particular goal), or evolutionary motives
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(investment reasons change over time) to engage in foreign direct investment (UNCTAD,
2006). The upper left cell in figure one simply suggests that the primary drivers of
outward foreign direct investment from aligned environments to other aligned
environments are traditional asset exploitation and augmentation motives.
Aligned at Home, Misaligned Abroad
Multinational enterprises sometimes engage in foreign direct investment into a
host country even though there is misalignment between its strategies and the institutions
of that country. This is often because the potential consumer market, efficiency gains,
and/or low cost labor costs of the host country make operating in a misaligned
environment worth the difficulties that are associated with experienced misalignment.
For example, many multinational enterprises from developed countries have decided to
engage in foreign direct investment into China and Mexico, though there are welldocumented difficulties in operating in these countries (e.g., excessive bureaucracy, poor
infrastructure, corruption, safety issues, etc.). It is possible, though, that the risk of not
entering a market may be greater than the increased cost of operating in a difficult
environment, e.g., a multinational enterprise may view potential initial losses as a small
ante gambled in hopes that a large and underexploited market may become profitable in
the near future. In this way, multinational enterprises believe that their preexisting firm
specific advantages (e.g., technology, managerial expertise, product knowledge, and
industry experience) can be exploited in such a way as to overcome the increased
transaction costs of operating in a difficult environment (Buckley & Casson, 1976;
Hymer, 1976). Thus, multinational enterprises in this quadrant have traditional
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motivations to engage in foreign direct investment and believe that they will be able to
overcome potential increased costs.
Multinational enterprises may also choose to enter misaligned environments in
order to establish legitimacy in the minds of consumers (Kostova et al., 2008). By
establishing host-country operations that employ locals, multinational enterprises may
overcome any liability of foreignness that its brands may encounter in the consumer
marketplace (Zaheer, 1995). Furthermore, multinational enterprises may feel the need to
invest in misaligned environments for the simple fact that global competitors are
investing in the country and as such the firm can’t risk being left out of the potential
market.
A company specific example might be Halliburton’s well-publicized move to
Dubai. By moving from the United States to the UAE, Halliburton moved from a
country generally considered to have high quality institutions to one ranking lower on
many indexes. While CEO, Dick Cheney lobbied the Clinton administration to ease
sanctions on Iran, while Halliburton subsidiaries – much like those of Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Cooper-Cameron, Exxon-Mobil, GE, Northrop-Grumman – actively engaged in
business with them (Jau, 2004). Critics claim that Halliburton was attempting to avoid
U.S. taxes and regulations. Halliburton, meanwhile, claims the move has nothing to do
with escape-based motives, citing proximity reasons for the move (i.e., this is where the
oil is today) and blaming criticism on political opportunism. Taking their reasoning at
face value, they would seem to be moving for a fairly traditional motive that is
compelling enough to them to offset any perceived misalignment with the institutional
environment on the whole. (If their critics are right, however, then perhaps this example
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belongs in the “escape” quadrant.) Thus, the lower left cell in figure one suggests that the
primary drivers of outward foreign direct investment from aligned environments to
misaligned environments are traditional asset exploitation and augmentation motives that
are compelling enough to overcome the misalignment.
Misaligned at Home and Abroad
During WWII it was noted that social scientists were often better at interpreting
wartime data than physical sciences; the theory was that they were used to working with
bad data and that practice thus conferred certain advantages upon them in this arena
versus physical scientists used to working with perfectly controlled experiments. Along
similar lines, developing market companies used to operating in suboptimal institutional
environments (e.g., third-world countries where graft is customary) may be better
equipped to do what it takes to get the job done versus multinational enterprises from
countries like the U.S. In situations such as these, it has been shown that emerging market
multinational enterprises (EMNEs) may have an advantage compared to multinational
enterprises in less developed markets, because they have more experience dealing with
similar institutional constraints at home, e.g., imperfect contracting environment, lessdeveloped market mechanisms, poor legal system, burdensome regulations, political
instability, etc. (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). In other
words, the managerial expertise gained at home in dealing with poor institutional
infrastructure becomes an asset and potentially a competitive advantage for developing
market multinational enterprises in dealing with the difficulties of another misaligned
environment. In this sense, a disadvantage in one setting at one point of time (i.e., having
a misaligned home market) may become an advantage in another setting or point of time.
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These multinational enterprises may also be better prepared to meet the consumer
preferences of a similar market. Thus, the lower right cell in figure one suggests that the
primary driver of outward foreign direct investment from misaligned environments to
other misaligned environments is a desire to exploit familiarity based advantages.
Misaligned at Home, Aligned Abroad (Escape)
Finally, the upper right quadrant depicts firms who decide to move parts of their
value chain abroad as an escape response when institutional factors at home are perceived
to be misaligned with multinational enterprise goals. The logic is as follows: (1)
international business literature suggests that host country institutions affect multinational
enterprise behavior and performance. (2) In line with the Northian (e.g., North, 1981)
economics lenses international business scholars draw upon (where, unlike in
international business, the dominant study of institutions involves the effects of home
country institutions on firm conduct and performance), the exact same logic with regard
to the capacity for institutions to affect firms abroad also applies at home, i.e., home
countries also have institutions, and institutions have effects here as well. (3) Thus, just
as they sometimes do when examining foreign institutions, decision makers at firms in
certain locales may sometimes feel that local institutions impede their ability to operate
as efficiently as they might prefer (i.e., institutions differ by country, with some settings
viewed more favorably than others; and the institutional matrix governing one's home
country may not always be deemed desirable). (4) As globalism has intensified
competitive pressures, decision makers within firms must thus consider potential
responses to institutional sources of inefficiency, one of which is moving parts of their
value chain to greener institutional pastures. Heterogeneous and non-ergodic institutional
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settings, after all, logically suggest a spiky global landscape where multinational
enterprises (and prospective multinational enterprises) are not obligated to stay in
locations not conducive to their success and may, thus, consider institutional arbitrage as
a legitimate option to improve their material lot. In other words, the escape literature
simply takes currently accepted logic (from the institutions and multinational enterprise
literature) and applies it to all countries, rather than merely host countries.
Studies considering home country institutions, either in isolation or relative to
potential hosts, offer suggestive evidence that escape motives may, indeed, exist. For
instance, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) find that multinational enterprises care about
labor market regulations, with higher host rigidities - on either an absolute or relative
basis - associated with lower foreign direct investment. Dewit et al. (2009) similarly
study home/host comparisons of labor laws and find that higher rigidities result in less
foreign direct investment. The fact that studies find that relative bases matter implies that
home conditions matter too and, thus, that escape-motives may be possible. Globerman
and Shapiro (2002) argue that good home institutions (testing a group including rule of
law, political stability, regulatory burden, government effectiveness, graft, and political
participation by citizens) should increase not just IFDI, but outward foreign direct
investment too, as they create conditions that make multinational enterprises with cash to
invest more likely to emerge in the first place. They also, however, note the possibility of
a counter-effect, i.e., if things are good at home, why leave? In other words – referring to
outward foreign direct investment as FDO – they claim that the same beneficial home
country institutions "that encourage foreign direct investment will discourage FDO" (p.
1912). Finding mixed support for their claims, their study implicitly suggests the
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possibility of an escape-motive; if beneficial institutions encourage firms to stay, it stands
to reason that less beneficial institutions may encourage firms, ceteris paribus, to leave.
With respect to more direct evidence, Table 2 offers an overview of the escape
literature, most of which is qualitative in nature, and much of which comes from adjacent
disciplines such as economics and political science. Witt and Lewin (2007) claim that
'escape' is an underexplored but important new area of international business inquiry. For
example, if one searches for "FDI" and "Foreign Direct Investment" on Google Scholar,
the number of cites for the studies on the first page of search results for each search term
alone adds up to nearly 16,000. In other words, tens of thousands of studies may focus
on, or refer to, FDI. Per Witt and Lewin’s (2007) claim, this means that the 27 studies in
Table 2 may represent less than 1% of 1% of the FDI literature.
Moreover, nearly all of these studies either adopts a qualitative or case-study
approach (with findings that may not generalize), or a quantitative approach with no
explicit mechanism designed to disentangle loss- from gain-base motives (leaving us
unsure of the degree to which FDI was actually motived by a desire to escape as opposed
to traditional gain-based motives). This means that the number of quantitative, empirical
examinations that adequately disentangle loss- from gain-seeking motives is even
smaller.
Thus, in response to Witt and Lewin's (2007) call for more exploration in this
area, I hope to help international business move beyond the study of the impact of
institutional distance or host country institutions on firm conduct and, instead, provide
rare quantitative, empirical evidence in support of my assertion that institutional
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Table 2
Review of 'Escape' Literature
Study

Summary of findings

Andreff (2003)

Offers examples of escape from
"restrictive regulations"

Boddewyn and Brewer (1994)

Escape is an expression of avoidance,
which constitutes one form of nonbargaining business political behavior

Caves (1996)

Suggests high home country tax rates spur
OFDI

Deng (2009)

Chinese OFDI is driven by home country
institutional forces, in the form of escape
from local institutional constraints or via a
push from local institutional incentives

Dunning and Lundan (2008)

Adds escape to Dunning's original 4 FDI
motives, offering example of MNES in
Hong Kong, China, America, Sweden, and
Europe in general escaping institutional
environments characterized by stringent
regulation and high taxation

Dunning (1996)

Says one FDI motive is "to escape
restrictive legislation or macroorganizational policies by home
governments" (p 61)

Duran (1987)*

Home market difficulties led to MNE
escape from Spain from 1979-1985

Gordon and Hines (2002)

Firms may escape to avoid high taxes

Herrmann (2009)*

Escape is one response to unsupportive
labor, antitrust and financial institutions

Jaklic and Svetlicic (2003)

Poor institutions leading to a poor
macroeconomic and business environment
led Slovenian firms to escape
(table continues)
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Table 2 (Continued)
Review of 'Escape' Literature
Study

Summary of findings

Kayam (2009)*

Institutional proxies related to
bureaucracy, corruption, investment risk
and labor conditions show that OFDI was
an escape response

Le and Zak (2006)*

Capital flight is driven by political
instability, economic risk and policy
uncertainty

Lewin et al. (2009)*

Offshoring is less a function of cheap labor
as it is an escape response to institutional
environments that are not conducive to the
creation of talented labor

Luo, Xue and Han (2010)

Examination of 29 regulations governing
Chinese OFDI suggests that OFDI is a
response to local institutions that push
firms abroad (escape and/or promotion)

Morck, Yeung, Zhao (2008)

Notes that restrictive business regulations
may be spurring Chinese OFDI

Mudambi and Navarra (2002)

Notes that when institutional settings are
no longer deemed competitive, firms may
decide to leave for more acceptable
settings

Nachum and Aharoni (2000)*

Service firms compensate for deteriorating
home country advantages by conducting
escape-based FDI

Narula (2002)

Institutions related to national innovation
systems hinder R&D efforts, prompting
OFDI to more suitable locales

Nijkamp (2006)

Adds escape to four common FDI motives
(e.g., western MNEs seeking to escape
restrictive home country regulatory
environments)
(table continues)
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Table 2 (Continued)
Review of 'Escape' Literature
Study

Summary of findings

Rugman and Verbeke (1998)

Conflict b/w MNEs and governments may
prompt opportunistic relocation

Schoppa (2006)

OFDI is in part an escape response to
overregulation

Stal and Cuervo-Cazurra (2011)

Brazilian OFDI is often an attempt to
escape institutional voids and excessive or
misguided regulations

Svetlicic and Jaklic (2006)

Primary motive in case studies was escape
from noncompetitive institutional
environments

Tallman (1988)*

Political instability at home influences
escape-based OFDI to U.S

Vernon (1988)

MNEs may escape to save on taxes or
avoid unhelpful governments

Witt and Lewin (2007)

IM in the form of high levels of societal
coordination lead to increased OFDI

Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds (2008)

Institutions favoring competitors may
prompt escape- based OFDI

* quantitative studies

misalignment affects firm conduct. Furthermore, I hope to do this by studying whether or
not misalignment at home prompts firms to move abroad in a way that accounts for the
effect of traditional motives.
I begin by examining various options available to firms when confronted with
institutional misalignment in their home country. When home country institutional
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misalignment is an issue, firms must decide how they will respond. Witt and Lewin's
(2007) taxonomy of multinational enterprise reactions to institutional misalignment
includes four potential choices: acceptance (analogous to “loyalty” in Hirschman's [1970]
famous political economy taxonomy), abatement (analogous to Hirschman’s “voice”),
diminution (no Hirschman analogue), and escape (roughly analogous to Hirschman’s
“exit”). DiMaggio (1994) and Oliver (1991) note that conforming, either consciously or
mimetically, confers legitimacy and access to capital. It is also typically the ‘status quo’
option.
Thus, the default strategy for many firms is simply Witt and Lewin's (2007) first
option: acceptance. Firms also often operate in negotiated environments, attempting
abatement strategies designed to change the misalignment, via lobbying or co-opting
misaligned elements (Oliver 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Diminution involves an
attempt to diminish the impact or cost of misalignment. For example, shared capital from
business groups and relationship based agreements in India and China may serve as
informal substitutes for underdeveloped financial and legal institutions (Kedia,
Mukherjee, & Lahiri, 2006; Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). Another example of
firms attempting to minimize the impact of institutional misalignment is offered via
Stone, Levy, and Paredes’ (1996) study of Brazilian firms operating in the informal
economy, as opposed to passively accepting onerous regulatory oversight.
Note that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and the divide between
domestic versus foreign company is not always crystal clear. Consider the example of
Maryland based candlemaker, Chesapeake Bay Candle (CBC). A “born global” firm,
i.e., a firm that was an multinational enterprise from inception, CBC, headquartered in the
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U.S. but with production exclusively in Asia, decided to build a plant in the U.S. As
Aeppel (2011) notes, unexpected regulatory hurdles in the U.S. led to expensive delays
and compliance costs, denting margins and forcing them to backup deliveries that were
supposed to have been manufactured domestically with products made abroad. In 2004,
however, the U.S. candle industry undertook political action and lobbied the government
to more than double import duties to over 108%. (Due to responses blurring the line
between abatement, compensatory diminution designed at offsetting the cost of
institutional mandates, and naked rent-seeking, Aeppel notes that U.S. candle makers
now enjoy an 80% domestic market share.)
Finally, if firms do not wish to accept the misalignment, and diminution and
abatement are insufficient, they may escape; as Mudambi and Navarra (2002) pithily
note, if a locale loses its competitiveness, firms may move.
Examples of Escape
Some institutions affect all, or at least most, firms. Other institutions affect a few
specific firms in isolation. I now provide examples of each type – from both the
scholarly literature and current headlines – that may help illustrate why firms may wish to
escape.
Duran’s (1987) study of Spanish multinational enterprises, and Mudambi and
Navarra’s (2002) overview of the study of institutions by international business scholars,
note that when general institutional conditions result in poor operating environments,
multinational enterprises experiencing difficulty within their home countries may
consider leaving.
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Nachum and Aharoni (2000) conceptually examine how deteriorating home
country conditions can erode home-based location advantages, prompting firms to
escape, and then conduct a study of U.S. service firms (advertising, managerial
consulting, engineering consulting, accounting, law), ultimately finding that “firms may
maintain their competitive position through foreign direct investment” (p. 76), as outward
foreign direct investment attenuates the negative effects of deteriorating home market
conditions. They also offer the example of misaligned labor markets prompting Japanese
manufacturers to escape. While their focus here was on conditions resulting in higher
labor costs, labor market rigidities of other types seem influential as well.
For example, in a paper titled, “Do Foreign Investors Care About Labor Market
Regulations”, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), find that labor market regulations
resulting in rigidities (e.g., laws dictating conduct with regard to the hiring or firing of
employees, or those that affect labor market climates in general) are associated with
lower foreign direct investment. As relative – and not just absolute – bases mattered,
this suggests that multinational enterprises are clearly cognizant of home market
conditions as opposed to simply focusing on institutional distance or host conditions.
Dewit et al. (2009) similarly explore home/host comparisons of labor laws, as opposed to
institutional distance or host conditions, and also find that higher rigidities negatively
impact multinational enterprise investment. Hermann’s (2009) study of pharmaceutical
companies based in Germany, Italy, and the U.K. goes a step farther, directly tying
misaligned labor market institutions (as well as institutions related to finance and antitrust
laws) with escape-based responses.
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Today’s headlines, in fact, are full of complaints from businesses that are unhappy
with various institutional policies within the countries they call home, with labor
intensive businesses operating in countries with rules that encourage rent-seeking (or are
simply inefficient) at the forefront. The Economist (e.g., 2012 [a]; 2012 [b]), for
example, has recently run a series of articles documenting problems along these lines in
both Italy and France (where mandated levels of social spending per employee – and the
unemployment rate – are twice as high as they are in post-reform Germany). The New
York Times (Geitner, 2012: 1), meanwhile, reports on this past June’s ruling by Europe’s
highest court which declared that if European workers get sick during their legally
guaranteed 6 weeks of annual vacation leave, they “were legally entitle to take another
vacation”. Firms that complain about having to absorb the cost of labor policies such as
these, while having to compete globally against firms that are free to operate more
efficiently, have no legal recourse.
In the U.S., Boeing’s battle versus the National Labor Relations Board (The Wall
Street Journal, 2011) has been in the headlines, as have complaints of U.S. executives in
Silicon Valley. The late Steve Jobs, for example, bitterly complained to President Barack
Obama about the regulations that gummed up the works for high-tech companies that
were supposed to be the country’s engine for growth, and about crippling union work
rules, before warning the President that if he did not make America more business
friendly, he would be a one-term president (Isaacson, 2011).
Kayam (2009), meanwhile, tested the effects of institutions related to
bureaucracy, corruption, investment risk and institutions affecting not just the cost of
labor, but also the availability of skilled workers, via a sample of outward foreign direct
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investment from 65 countries from 2000-2006. Noting that home country institutional
conditions were indirectly related to outward foreign direct investment, he suggests that
firms move abroad as an escape response.
Lewin, Massini, and Peeters (2009) similarly focuses on the impact of home
market institutions on the availability of skilled labor (e.g., H1B visa rules), and how this
affects the offshoring (both outsourced and captive, i.e, foreign direct investment) of
innovation functions: “Consistent with Oliver (1991), we assume that companies react
strategically to consequences of misalignments between their strategic needs and the
configuration of the institutional structure and the macro environment in which they are
embedded... Firms can react by, for example, escaping the institutional constraints of the
country (Witt & Lewin, 2007) and responding to the emerging talent shortage by
accessing talent offshore and by learning to globalize their innovation activities.” (p.
906). Employing survey data of managers involved in 476 projects, they find that the
desire to escape home markets where institutions result in a shortage of skilled labor is an
important driver of moving business functions abroad, while labor arbitrage designed to
capitalize on home/host cost differentials is less important than many assume.
Similarly focusing on innovation, Narula (2002) conducted surveys of 35
Norwegian R&D firms, finding that those focused on radical innovation characterized by
technological discontinuity often feel that new institutional settings are more aligned with
their goals than home country institutions. Characterized by firms as slow, an
impediment to dynamism, and seemingly designed to regulate low technology, resourcebased sectors, firms cite high levels of paperwork and bureaucracy. Local institutions are
also perceived to be a barrier to the development of homegrown talent, with firms noting
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that their access to qualified labor is not aided by institutions, but developed “in spite of
the government” (p. 812). Thus, many of these firms expand abroad in an attempt to
escape excessive regulation and other forms of institutional misalignment.
Dunning (1996) and Nijkamp (2006) add escape desires to Dunning’s original
four foreign direct investment motivations (market, resource, asset and efficiency
seeking), with Dunning claiming foreign direct investment may occur "to escape
restrictive legislation or macro-organizational policies by home governments" (p. 61).
Oliver (1991) and Hirschman (1970) speak of escape from burdensome regulation, noting
that American chemical manufacturers moved abroad to sell domestically banned
chemicals, while Wallison (2006), Factor (2006), Murray (2006) and Leon (2006)
suggest that foreign stock exchanges, especially the LSE, have been among the biggest
beneficiaries of Sarbanes-Oxley, as firms decide to register abroad. Andreff (2003),
Jaklic and Svetlicic (2003), Morck et al., (2008), Schoppa (2006), Svetlicic and Jaklic
(2006), and Witt and Lewin (2007) offer further examples of escape-based foreign direct
investment. This year's FDI Confidence Index (2012) echoes these findings, noting that
upon asking Global 1000 executives in North America, Europe, and Asia about issues
related to foreign direct investment, "the most significant concern…is regulatory activity
within countries" (p. 7).
The experience of medical research firm, Regenexx, offers a striking example of a
firm-specific case of institutional misalignment related to regulation. In an Wall Street
Journal op-ed this past April, former FD commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach (2012)
noted that as FDA commissioner, he “saw firsthand how regenerative medicine offered a
cure for kidney and heart failure and other chronic conditions like diabetes” (p. 15),
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before noting that breakthroughs, however, “have been stalled by regulatory uncertainty”
and are, thus, “a long way off”. He continues: “The FDA isn't obstructing progress
because its employees are mean-spirited or foolish”. They are, instead, bound by
dysfunctional rules. Thus, innovation is slowed relative to competitors in more
hospitable institutional settings. As an example, he notes that Regenexx invented a way
to repair damaged joints using patients’ own stem cells, U.S. regulations were simply too
burdensome and onerous relative to rules in other countries.
Stal and Cuervo-Cazurra (2011) suggest that the desire to escape institutional
voids, as firms attempt to avoid excessive or misguided regulations for settings where
institutions are more developed and in closer alignment with multinational enterprise
goals, is one of two major factors spurring Brazilian outward foreign direct investment.
Luo, Xue, and Han (2010) examine 29 regulations governing Chinese outward foreign
direct investment and ultimately suggesting that outward foreign direct investment is a
response to local institutions that push firms abroad. Sometimes this is a direct response
to regulation, while at other times it is an attempt to escape institutional voids related to
property rights or legal systems that are more likely to exist abroad. Deng (2009) and
Yiu et al. (2007) provide further evidence that outward foreign direct investment may be
driven by home country institutional forces, often in the form of escape from institutional
voids or from institutional settings that favor competitors.
Yamakawa, Peng, and Deed (2008) also claim that institutional misalignment
whereby politicians pass laws which favor competitors may prompt escape-based
outward foreign direct investment. Escape may also be a response to institutional
misalignment arising as a result of political instability or conflict between home
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governments and multinational enterprises (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Le & Zak, 2006;
Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Tallman, 1988).
Vernon (1998) suggested escape as a response to not just misaligned political
institutions, but to excessive taxation as well. Benassy-Quere et al. (2005) note that
liberalization of capital flows allows firms to escape high tax settings, while Boskin and
Gale (1987) show that domestic tax policy changes increasing domestic levels of business
investment by $1 prevents $.04 from moving. Harris (1993) finds that removing
favorable tax treatment of domestic capital expenditures results in increased multinational
enterprise spending abroad. Slemrod (1990) suggests that multinational enterprise
transfers to foreign subsidiaries increased when U.S. tax burdens increased. Meanwhile,
Hines and Rice (1994) have noted that the share of total U.S. capital abroad located in
''tax haven" countries has increased rapidly over the years, with Clausing (2005)
mentioning escape as the reason, while noting that 6 of the top 10 U.S. multinational
enterprise affiliate locations have effective tax rates of 9% or less. Hajkova, Nicoletti,
Vartia, and Yoo (2006) summarizes 13 tax related foreign direct investment studies,
showing an average semi-elasticity of -2.94. Gropp and Kostial (2000) find evidence that
high domestic taxes influence multinational enterprises to invest abroad before showing
that low tax countries have half the net outflow as high tax countries, and estimating that
high taxes may have cost Italy and Germany up to half of one percent of GDP annually in
terms of lost revenue due to escape. Caves (1996), Collins and Schackelford (1995),
Gordon and Hines (2002), and Hines (1991) similarly suggest taxes as a cause of escapebased outward foreign direct investment.
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Lest readers object that this is an axiom – of course firms will leave if they think
local institutions hurt their competitiveness! – I would remind them that the question is
not actually settled. It is an empirical issue, which must be empirically tested, before we
can definitively claim that our intuitive prediction is actually truth. Considering taxation,
for example, remember that this is a day and age of transfer pricing, serving to mitigate
the effects of corporate taxes. It is also a time of agglomeration, with firms increasingly
locating within, or near, industry specific hubs in places like Silicon Valley, irrespective
of the tax consequences. Accordingly, many scholars (the most prominent of whom may
also be the most vocal, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman) claim that countries may often
raise taxes with relative impunity, as firms will not necessarily leave (Andersson &
Forslid, 2003; Baldwin & Krugman, 2004; Borck & Pflüger, 2006; Brülhart, Jametti, &
Schmidheiny, 2012; Kind, Knarvik, & Schjelderup, 2000; Ludema & Wooton, 2000).
Thus, one further contribution of this dissertation will be to provide further evidence
regarding whether this specific form of institutional misalignment prompts escape
decisions or not.
I finally offer a slightly more compelling example – a short case study of a single
country – before describing how I will conduct my own test of whether escape is a
genuine phenomenon or not.
The German Example
In the example of firms being unhappy with labor institutions in France, I noted
that French regulations were different that those in post-reform Germany. This begs the
question: why did Germany reform? It may have something to do with institutions
prompting firms to escape, and the desire of the German government to reverse that
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trend. From 1995 to the early 2000s, the German economy struggled, as GDP per capita
fell by more than a third and didn’t fully recover until 2004. To make matters worse,
foreign direct investment inflows dropped from $27.2 billion in 2003 to negative $38.6
billion in 2004 after revisions to the German tax code made it less attractive for foreign
companies to retain liquid assets in Germany (A.T. Kearney, 2005). Witt and Lewin
(2007) found a 400% surge in outbound foreign direct investment between 1990 and
2003, standardized for GDP. Furthermore, the Bundesbank explicitly pointed to taxes,
social security contributions, and burdensome regulations and labor market inflexibilities
driving German firms to escape (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1997), while Buch, Kleinert,
Lipponer, and Toubal (2005), citing more recent Bundesbank surveys of German
executive outward foreign direct investment rational, similarly noted high domestic labor
costs, taxes, and levels of bureaucracy as reasons for leaving. Muller and Student (2003),
in fact, found that every seventh entrepreneur surveyed planned to move some production
abroad, every ninth planned to move all production abroad, and every 13th planned to
move their headquarters abroad, while Piotti (2007) examined articles in the German
press discussing German firms leaving the country and found that among the over 250
articles, 70% of them attribute the exits to a lack of competitiveness associated with
institutional factors such as high tax rates and labor market inefficiencies as opposed to
the attractiveness of foreign lands. Finally, Schneider (2008) notes that increased taxes
and social security payments, burdensome labor market rules, insufficient institutional
quality, and low tax morale have resulted in a shadow economy of roughly 15% of GDP.
With Germany serving as a fairly modern Hayekian reminder that firms may not view
themselves as pieces on a chessboard to be moved around by the whims of technocrats,
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the upper right cell in figure one suggests that a significant driver of outward foreign
direct investment from misaligned environments to aligned environments may be a desire
to escape the misaligned environment.
Most of these examples of escape, whether recounted in the media or offered by
scholars, share one of two common weaknesses. The first is that the majority consist of
qualitative case studies based on either anecdote or observation of single, or small groups
of, firms. Thus, even if escape was a primary motive, we do not know if this motive
generalizes to broader settings. The second limitation is that the few studies that are
quantitative are typically suggestive in nature. In other words, they either offer findings
that are consistent with escape-based hypotheses without actually directly testing whether
firms escape, or they fail to control for the possibility that escape has a flip side: gain.
Thus, how do we know for sure that firms who venture abroad are not actually doing so
on the basis of traditional gain-seeking motives? For example, if a firm leaves a high-tax
for a low-tax locale, is this efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment or escape? In the
next section, I describe how I approach these issues.
Behavioral Decision Making
Witt and Lewin (2007) find a .52 correlation between an increase in a country’s
outward foreign direct investment stock and the degree to which centralized bureaucrats
and politicians attempt to coordinate multinational enterprise action, and suggest that the
reason for this correlation may be a desire to escape less hospitable institutional
environments. They then note that "outward foreign direct investment will exhibit
different characteristics depending on whether the motivation behind firm strategy is
framed in the minds of the decision-makers in terms of seeking to capitalize on improved
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conditions abroad or in terms of avoiding deteriorating conditions at home" (2007: 590).
This raises a tricky question, however: how do researchers delineate gain- versus escapebased motives within quantitative, empirical studies? As Benassy-Quere et al.'s (2007)
critique of Globerman and Shapiro (2002) – due to their inability to consider both home
and host county institutions simultaneously – suggests: findings that do not address this
question should be interpreted with caution Figure 4's depiction of the four traditional
foreign direct investment motives illustrates this issue. (Consider the previously offered
example of a firm moves from a high to a low tax country; again, how do observers
determine if their motive the potential gain of cost savings abroad or an actual desire to
escape an inhospitable environment?)
It should be formally noted that I do not suggest foreign direct investment
motivations are mutually exclusive. In fact, I assume that motives probably exist
simultaneously or, that if sequenced, then once a firm does decide to exit a country for
greener institutional pastures, traditional foreign direct investment motives do come into
play at that point. After all, once a firm decides to escape, why not choose refuge within
countries offering lucrative markets or resources, or in countries offering desirable
efficiency or strategic considerations? The problem is how to tease out escape-based
motives from the larger set of motives that undoubtedly drive foreign direct investment
decisions. With this problem in mind, Witt and Lewin (2007) suggest that cognitive
psychology offers an answer in the form of a rich behavioral decision-making literature
that studies heuristics associated with various cognitive biases, biases that may serve as a
useful lens that helps scholars disentangle gain-based and escape-based motives.
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Figure 4. Illustration of Entanglement Problem ('E' Represents Escape)

Cognitive biases, simply put, are decision-making heuristics employed by the
brain to help it make decisions. Perhaps the most famous example of bias is Kahneman
and Tversky’s 1979 paper on prospect theory (prospect theory), which is the most cited
article in Econometrica history (over 26,000 cites according to Google Scholar as of
June, 2013), and for which Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize (Maccoun 2002).
The basic finding is that decision-making behavior is governed by frames of
reference related to the prospect of loss versus gain. For example:
Example 1. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) found over 70% of people
make a certain choice when a problem framed one way, but the opposite
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choice when the exact same problem is framed differently, e.g., “200 of
600 people will die” vs. “400 of 600 people will be saved”.
Example 2. Carmon and Ariely (2000) studied students at Duke
University who either won or didn’t win Final Four basketball tickets in a
lottery and found a 1400% difference in WTP (Willingness to Pay,
representing potential gain) and WTA (Willingness to Accept,
representing loss aversion) values, when the rationally expected difference
should be close to 0%.
When studying the impact of reference frames on decisions, one immediately
recognizes is that cognitive biases often dominate rational calculus, as the intensity of
pain associated with losses is greater than the intensity of joy associated with gains.
Fully rational actors should exhibit subjective valuations of gains and losses that are
comparable to actual losses. Instead, what researchers typically find is that actual and
subjective values do not correspond on a one-to-one basis. If subjective values are
pegged to the actual values of gains, so that one unit of actual gain is equal to one unit of
subjective value, one unit of actual losses tends to less than one unit of subjective gain
(on an absolute basis, i.e., -2 and +2 each has an absolute value of 2).
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5, which superimposes Kahneman and
Tverksy’s (1979) originally proposed prospect-theory value function on top of the value
function that Li and Yang (2012) recently found. The expected value function (the red
line) is based on a rational analysis of mathematical equivalence. For example, if a
decision makes $100 or avoids a $100 loss, the net gain is the same either way: $100.
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Figure 5. Prospect Theory Value Function

Rational decision-makers thus have no preference between these two options. The blue
lines represent the value functions according to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) and Li
and Yang's (2012) studies.
The difference between Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) value function and Li
and Yang's (2012) value function reminds us that actually measured subjective values
may differ according to sample or context. For example, empirically derived estimates of
how much more subjective value is associated with the desire to avoid loss relative to the
desire to seek gains often conclude that losses are weighted roughly twice as heavily as
gains (Hastie and Dawes, 2001). Li and Yang’s (2012) Journal of Financial Economics
study, however, found that losses are weighted nearly four times as heavily as gains when
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expected return distributions are negatively skewed in the minds of decision-makers (as
they often are in the domain of losses).
Regardless of how much more weight decision makers give to avoiding loss
versus the seeking of gain, the common finding is that the direction of bias remains (with
loss-aversion always a more powerful motive relative to gain-seeking).
The implication of these findings for escape-based outward foreign direct
investment is that executive decisions regarding whether to move abroad may differ
depending upon whether the decision is framed in terms of avoiding losses associated
with institutional misalignment or in terms of the prospect for gain associated with
traditional foreign direct investment motives.
A Potential Problem
The widespread acceptance of behavioral decision-making theories suggests that
there is something to them. There is a potential problem, however, with respect to
applying these theories to business settings. Claiming that decision-making heuristics
associated with cognitive biases affect investors, heads of states, researchers, physicians,
students, and other common subjects of this literature is, quite simply, not the same thing
as showing that it is applicable to decision-makers within firms, who have the capacity to
make foreign direct investment decisions. After all, while heads-of-state or social
scientists at Stanford and MIT are intelligent decision makers, CEOs and other top
management team members are generally assumed to be more like doctors in the above
example, i.e., both intelligent and experienced experts with respect to the types of
decisions they regularly make as a part of their job. This may attenuate bias (with the
possible exception of biases related to hubris? Also, multinational enterprise decisions
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may be made by groups. All it takes, in theory, to prevent cognitive bias from
influencing an otherwise rational decision is for one member of the group to catch it and
enlighten the rest.
Finally, the discipline inherently provided by markets for managerial control, and
by consumer markets in general, may select for firms and managers that are less prone to
irrational biases, as firms that underperform (or go out of business) replace (or release)
these less rational managers. Thus, before one accepts the claim that behavioral theories
are an acceptable lens for studying firm conduct, a number issues must first be broached.
Fortunately, the organizational decision-making, group decision making, psychology, and
medical literatures offer a rich and robust study of just such issues.
Intelligent Experts
Regarding intelligence, these literatures suggest that high general mental aptitude
and being an ‘expert’ in an area are generally orthogonal traits with respect to degrees of
susceptibility to cognitive bias induced errors of reasoning (Christensen, Elstein,
Bernstein, and Balla, 1991; Kuhberger, 1998; Loke & Tan, 1992). For instance,
Stanovich and West (2008) document seven such studies, finding very little difference
between the susceptibility of high cognitive groups versus low cognitive groups.
Groups
Regarding the applicability of findings at the individual level of analysis to groups
of people making decisions (as is often the case within firms), Kameda and Davis (1990),
Neale and Northcraft (1986), and Whyte and Sebenius (1997) find that groups are often
prone to many of the same cognitive biases that affect individuals. Kuhberger’s (1998)
meta-analysis confirms that results are robust when groups are studied as opposed to
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individuals, while Milch, Weber, Appelt, Handgraaf, and Krantz (2009), referring to the
same risk-based decision making outcomes predicted by prospect theory, note that, “For a
risky choice problem, a similar framing effect was observed for groups and individuals”
p. (242).
Firms
Biases like prospect theory do seem to generalize from individuals to highly
intelligent individuals, who may make decisions together rather than in isolation. While
certainly suggestive, this does not necessarily mean that groups of smart people within
firms are similarly susceptible. Fortunately, there is a literature that addresses this
subject. DiMaggio (1994) notes that organizations are prone to similar cognitive biases
as individuals are, while Andersen, Denrell, and Bettis (2007), Devers, Wiseman, and
Holmes (2007), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (2004), Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb,
and Mcguire (2011), Mayhew (1979), and March and Shapira (1987) suggest prospect
theory is applicable at the organization level of analysis in addition to the individual
level. Roxburgh (2003) also catalogues various cognitive biases that affect CEOs and
other high-level decision makers within firms, while Hult (2011) documents prospect
theory as a potential driver of managerial decisions.
In the strategic management literature, Teece (2007) invokes prospect theory to
explain how managerial decision making, influenced by instinctively loss-averse
mindsets, results in an undervaluing of innovative, versus incremental, investments, and,
thus, the failure to develop dynamic capabilities: "Contemporary developments in the
decision sciences highlight the critical influence of felt emotions on choice...a welter of
evidence demonstrates that when assessments based on affect are at odds with those
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based on computation, the visceral often overpowers the rational to determine behavior”
(p. 1507).
Finally, suggesting a key potential moderator, Forlani (2002) suggests prospect
theory is most suitable when managers have less direct control over outcomes – a finding
that meshes well with previously mentioned foreign direct investment studies that suggest
outward foreign direct investment occurs when firms have no direct control over the
institutions that temper their efficiency or help their competitors.
Internationalization Decisions
Horn, Lovallo, and Viguerie (2005) document the effect of cognitive bias on
market entry. In terms of foreign direct investment decisions, specifically, BenassyQuere et al. (2005) and Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999) note that increasing tax rates
seem to disturb firms more than decreasing rates seem to please, which seems to imply
that losses hurt more than gains feel good, just as prospect theory predicts. Witt and
Lewin (2007), meanwhile, draw upon prospect theory research (Gilovich, Griffin, and
Kahneman (2002); Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982); Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Thaler, 1994) that suggests foreign direct investment decisions
are, indeed, influenced by prospect theory. Buckley, Devinney, and Louviere (2007),
Hosseini (1994, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008), Rosenboim, Luski, and Shavit (2008), Simelyte
and Liucvaitiene (2012) and Tang and Zhen (2009) provide further support for the
assertion that prospect theory's predicted loss-aversion affects managers making foreign
direct investment decisions.
Aharoni (2011) summarizes research on behavioral decision-making and foreign
direct investment, and forcefully argues that the literature suggests foreign direct
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investment decisions are influenced by behavioral elements (such as prospect theory) in
addition to rational analysis: "Clearly, managers behave according to different rules than
those assumed in much of the international business literature" (p. 23). Pointing to
shortcomings in both rationalist and internationalization approaches to foreign direct
investment (related to a complete lack of incorporation of actual decision making
processes and associated theory), Devinney (2011) notes that foreign direct investment
decisions, as opposed to most managerial decisions, involve complex sets of possible
choices that may involve many managers, many intermediate decisions, many
consultations with many advisors or policymakers; more decisions and more decision
makers mean more uncertainty and also more chances for behavioral biases to take root,
leading him to ultimately suggest that "...the reality is that 'firms' do not make decisions.
Managers make choices - either as a group or individually - nested in the environments
and organizations in which they operate"... (p. 63) and rigorous incorporation of theory
combined with solid empirical evidence mandates the acknowledgement that managers
making foreign direct investment decisions "may bring with them all the behavioral
baggage of human decision making as well as the complexity and randomness of their
organizations" (p. 64).
Similarly noting that biases are potentially influential with each involved decision
maker at each step in the foreign direct investment decision making process, PinheiroAlves' (2008) survey of decision makers involved in 112 foreign direct investment deals
in Portugal in 2004 (12% of all recorded deals) determined that behavioral heuristics
accurately predict foreign direct investment decisions, and that uncertainty increases the
reliance on these cognitive rules.
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Appeal to Logic
In addition to an appeal to literature to support claims that prospect theory may
affect managerial decision making, I also rely on an appeal to logic. As an example,
consider Ma and Wright (2010), who found that while agency theory (AT) and prospect
theory both predict risk averse managerial decisions prior to the implementation of
appropriate corporate governance mechanisms designed to promote healthy levels of risk
taking, post-implementation decisions diverge along the lines of managerial competence.
AT assumes rational managers and predicts increased risk taking in response to
mechanisms that align incentives in a way that makes it in a manager’s material selfinterest to take more risk. Prospect theory, however, assumes less rational managers who
are not sufficiently swayed by these corporate governance mechanisms, as they are
irrationally risk-averse. Attempting to reconcile these predictions, Ma and Wright found
that the behavior of competent managers was better predicted by AT, while prospect
theory predicted the behavior of less competent, and presumably less rational, managers.
There are several differences, however, between the scenarios examined by Ma
and Wright (2010) and the setting I examine. First, specific governance mechanisms
prompted divergence in their study; no such mechanisms prompt divergence with respect
to foreign direct investment decisions. Second, consider the assumption that efficient
managerial markets, characterized by good corporate governance and low corruption,
weeds out irrational managers; my sample is Latin American, and Latin America
consistently rates worse on both corruption and corporate governance indexes than the
U.S. (GMI, 2011; WorldBank, 2012). Goto (2007) documents billion dollar decisions
made by firms that were clearly subject to behavioral biases, before offering a two-
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pronged prevention strategy – first, acknowledge that your managers are likely subject to
subconscious biases, and second, implement appropriate compensatory governance
offsets; the lack of common foreign direct investment-specific mechanisms combined
with less efficient overall governance suggests a potentially increased role for behavioral
heuristics. Hagigi and Sivakumar (2009) similarly note the capacity for governance
mechanisms and behavioral heuristics to interact, before ultimately concluding, "There is
an increased awareness in practice that incorporating the behavioral considerations is
necessary in effectively managing risk" (p. 291). Either way, here too logic suggests that
the absence of ameliorating mechanisms may result in a greater susceptibility to the
subconscious influence of cognitive heuristics as opposed to a purely unbiased, cold,
calculative rationality, when making decisions. Third, consider calculative versus
emotive modes of decision making, with calculative decision making being associated
with rationality and emotive decision making associated with less rational feelings or gut
instincts; Latin America consistently scores higher on scales of emotive culture relative to
the U.S. (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).
Finally, I do not claim that prospect theory applies to all managers, or that this
study is definitive. I merely claim that prospect theory applies to some managers. (My
goal is not to test the extent to which prospect theory affects managers; I merely wish to
use its impact on the managers it does affect to tease escape-based motives out from the
broader set of traditional motives.) If my hypotheses are supported, while not definitive,
they may constitute an interesting first step.
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Escape Motive and FDI Propensity
The chain of logic in this dissertation thus far, supported at each explicitly listed
step by scholarly literature, real world examples, and accompanying theoretical logic,
was as follows: (1) Institutions matter, in that they affect firm performance and, in a
preemptive bid to avoid negative performance outcomes, firm conduct. (2) With respect
to institutions, this includes host country institutions and their degree of alignment
(institutional misalignment) with multinational enterprise efforts to operate efficiently.
(3) With respect to firm conduct, it includes internationalization decisions. (4) The
specific decision to move abroad in order to escape from home countries characterized by
institutional misalignment is no exception to this general multinational enterprise desire
to operate efficiently. (5) Most associated studies, however, are qualitative in nature
(with limited generalizability), and those that are not typically examine theorized
covariates with internationalization (e.g., bureaucracy and outward foreign direct
investment, or labor regulations and offshoring) and then simply assume escape was the
motive, without definitively ruling out or explicitly accounting for potentially
overlapping traditional foreign direct investment motives. (6) A natural experiment
based research design combined with a prospect theory lens may help disentangle
traditional foreign direct investment motives (based on gain-seeking abroad) and escapebased motives (based on avoiding loss at home). The suitability of a prospect theory lens
is contingent upon literature – which I have referred to – that suggests that (7) decisions
are often driven by behavioral heuristics like prospect theory, and this includes decisions
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made (8) by groups of people (9) within firms, (10) including decisions specifically
related to multinational enterprise internationalization, e.g., foreign direct investment.
Based on this 10-step argument, I now offer several specific prospect theoryinformed foreign direct investment scenarios and accompanying hypotheses. Figure 6
depicts either a continuation of, or one of two possible departures from, equilibrium
(under the assumption that changes in a firm’s current or potential operating
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Figure 6. Prospect Theory Suggests Examining Mathematically Similar Scenarios

environments may spur changes in firm conduct.) Three possible institutional states exist
– deteriorating, static, and improving – for both home countries (on the X axis) and host
countries (on the Y axis). A hypothesized move from one state to the next state results in
a gain or loss of plus or minus one category, relative to the initial category.
For example, a firm moving from a neutral institutional environment to an
improving one has presumably made a categorical jump (from equilibrium) equal to plus
one, while a firm moving from a deteriorating environment to an improving one has
made a categorical jump equal to plus two.
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Note that moves from deteriorating to static countries and from static to
improving countries each result in a categorical jump of plus one, while moves from
deteriorating to deteriorating countries or from static to static countries result in a
categorical change of zero. Prospect theory predicts that mathematically similar
departures from equilibrium will result in heterogeneous outcomes, i.e., the desire to
avoid loss (due, in this case, to institutional deterioration) is stronger than the desire to
seek gain. For example, a $100 gain (or a $10 million gain, for that matter) does not have
the same value as avoiding a $100 loss (or a $10 million loss), despite the fact that a
rational economic analysis suggests that the outcomes should be equally valued.
Similarly, a +1 change in a firm’s institutional environment based on seeking gain will
not have the same subjective value as a +1 change based on avoiding loss.
This suggests that roughly homogeneous degrees of institutional change may
yield heterogeneous FDI decisions (depending on whether the motive is loss-avoidance
or gain-seeking). In other words, the type of FDI – either FDI from deteriorating settings
(to avoid loss at home) or FDI from static settings (to gain profits abroad) – should
impact the propensity of FDI (the frequency at which we see deals occur). In short, if it
is determined that prospect theory is a reasonable tool in terms of its applicability as a
lens through which we may judge foreign direct investment decisions, then the former
should be more common than the latter.
Therefore, based on the previous line of reasoning, and as an answer to Witt and
Lewin’s (2007) call for scholars to use prospect theory as a lens to analyze categorical
departures from institutional equilibrium, I propose the following proposition and
associated hypothesis:
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P1. Home country institutional deterioration is a more powerful motivator than
host country improvement
H1. Ceteris paribus, OFDI propensity from deteriorating home settings is
greater than it is from static settings
Escape Motives and Deal Characteristics
I have just suggested that “FDI type” (i.e., whether FDI originates from
deteriorating or static settings) may help explain the “FDI propensity” (i.e., the likelihood
of deals occurring), with FDI from deteriorating settings that exceeds FDI from static
settings (once mathematical outcome equivalence is imposed) reflecting desires on the
parts of firms to escape from such settings. If revealed preferences (i.e., ‘actions’ as
opposed to stated preferences) help us infer that a desire to escape from deteriorating
institutional settings may, indeed, be a genuine OFDI motive, then several natural followup questions present themselves. Figure 7 provides a summary of these follow up
research questions.
Perhaps the immediate question that comes to mind is whether key characteristics
of escape-based acquisitions, such as the size of these deals, differ from traditional gainbased deals. It is possible, for example, that the same situation that gives rise to the
escape motive gives rise to related desires that manifest themselves via various deal
characteristics. Perhaps escape-based deals from deteriorating settings are qualitatively
different than deals based on traditional gain-seeking motives.
On the other hand, it is also quite possible that the desire to escape triggers the
FDI decision, but once that decision has been made, normal decision-making routines
kick in. In other words, while institutional misalignment may spur FDI decisions, deal
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characteristics may not necessarily differ. Thus, once we control for traditional FDI
motives, we might see more frequent deals coming from countries where institutions are
misaligned with firm goals; but even though there are more deals, each individual deal
may, nevertheless, look fairly similar in terms of deal size, target size, etc. (as prospective
deals were evaluated according to similar decision-making schema).
Prospect theory’s predicted loss aversion suggests that deal characteristics may,
indeed, differ. It stands to reason that if decision-makers are loss averse, then firms in
deteriorating markets will want to extricate themselves in short order, in order to stop the
bleeding (as avoiding loss is a more powerful motivator than seeking gain). Thus,
investing firms with escape motives will prioritize ease of leaving over more extensive
due diligence relative to gain-seeking firms. (This is not to say speed is more important
than value. Only that it is more important to escaping firms than it is to gain-seeking
firms. For example, instead of demanding very high levels of value, perhaps solid levels
will suffice if deals are consummated quickly.)
The decision-making literature supports this claim, via suggestions that the
potential for loss leads to feelings of stress among decision makers, which in turn leads to
faster decision-making, in an attempt to prevent the loss and/or stop the bleeding as
quickly as possible (e.g., Busemeyer, 1982, 1985; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993;
Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983; Gray, 1999). The biology and neuroscience literatures offer
physical mechanisms that explain how the potential for loss is translated into negative
feelings and a quickening of decision-speed (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio, 2000;
Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein & Cohen, 2008; Starcke & Brand, 2012). Finally, the
management literature offers verification that this is, indeed, what happens, i.e., the
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prospect for loss results in quicker decision-speed (e.g., Amason & Mooney, 2008;
Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Teece, 2007).
In order to test my hypotheses, I examine cross-border acquisitions emanating
from Latin America (since acquisitions constitute the bulk of foreign direct investment
activity). As illustrated in Figure 8, Boone and Mulherin (2007) note that in typical
deals, activity from private initiation of deals to their public announcement often takes
much longer than the time from announcement to effective resolution. In the two
examples they analyze in detail, this ‘private’ process from initiation to public
announcement took twice as long as the ‘public’ process from announce to effective dates
(8 and 12 months in private versus 4 and 6 months in public). Furthermore, internal firm
activities – such as those related to search, diligence, decision-making and the garnering
of approval from pertinent managers and boards of directors – only adds to the time spent
acquiring firms that goes on behind the scenes, before deals are publicly announced.
When adding the pre-takeover phase to the private takeover phase, up to 80% or more of
M&A activity may take place behind closed doors before the public is ever formally
made aware.
While some evidence exists to support the notion that firms from deteriorating
institutional settings attempt to shorten the public-takeover phase (e.g., in my own sample
the average duration is 50% shorter for escaping firms to complete deals after they are
announced relative to gain-seeking firms, 31 versus 45 days), my focus is primarily on
the earlier phases of acquisition, as these seem to be where the most impactful time
savings may be found. I thus suggest that firms with escape-motives will seek to reduce
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Primary
Research
Question
(1) Does
escape
happen?
Is there
actually a
fifth FDI
motive (based
on the desire
to escape
instituitonally
deteriorating
settings)?

(3) Does the degree of institutional
change matter to escaping firms?

Follow Up
Questions
(Refinement)

Motive may matter (i.e., escaping firms may
prefer different deals than non-escaping firms).
But does the degree of change matter when
comparing escaping firms with each other?

(2) Does having an escape motive
affect deal characteristics?
If the desire to escape from institutionally
misaligned settings is a genuine FDI
motive, then perhaps escape-based deals
look different than traditional deals.
On the other hand, perhaps established
decision-making processes and routines
kick in once decisions to invest abroad are
made, i.e., while deal propensity changes,
deal characteristics do not.

For example, do firms that escape from
institututional settings with high levels of
deterioration prefer different types of deals than
firms that escape from more moderately
deteriorating settings?

(4) Does the degree of change
matter more for escaping firms
(deterioration at home) vs. firms
with traditional FDI motives
(improvement abroad)?
After determining the effect of the degree of
change on escaping firms, we can compare it
to the effect of the degree of change on firms
with traditional FDI motives.
(Theoretically inconsistent single effects
require discrete analysis.)

Figure 7. Overview of Research Questions
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the time needed to gain internal approval to make offers (shortening the pre-takeover
phase), and also reduce the time needed to convince sellers to formally accept offers
(shortening the private-takeover phase). M&A research suggests that certain deal
characteristics are associated with shorter takeover periods.
Faster internal approval (i.e., approval from firm stakeholders to proceed with the
deal) is related to less aggressive acquisition strategies and smaller deal sizes (more
aggressive deals, i.e., growth- rather than value-oriented deals, and larger deals
involve more scrutiny and require greater amounts of lobbying and preparation) (Baum &
Wally, 2003; Gole & Morris, 2007). Faster external approval (i.e., obtaining acceptance
of an offer from a target), meanwhile, is related to: higher premiums paid (the sweeter the
offer, the quicker the acceptance), friendly target dispositions (hostile deals take longer to
complete), and private ownership (public firms take longer to make decisions due to
additional degrees of oversight, e.g., board of director or regulatory scrutiny, and higher
degrees of formalization) (Dikova, Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2009; Reed, Lajoux,
&Nesvold; Simon, 1976). Choosing bigger targets with high market valuations and large
amounts of tangible assets may facilitate quicker consummations via both internal and
external channels, by garnering easier internal approval (versus the acquisition of smaller,
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Figure 8. Merger and Acquisitions Timeline
Source: Adapted from Boone and Mulherin (2007)
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highly unfamiliar targets) and quicker external acceptance (due to the greater likelihood
of larger firms having routines and perhaps even M&A departments in place) (Boone &
Mulherin , 2007; Gole & Morris, 2007; Reed et al., 2007).
Combining prospect theory’s prediction of loss aversion with the M&A
literature’s suggestions with regard to deal characteristics that are associated with quicker
deals prompts me to propose the following:
P2. Firms from deteriorating settings (where FDI Type reflects a desire
to escape) will emphasize the speed of deals (i.e., they will seek
deals that facilitate quicker internal approval and/or external
acceptance)
H2.

Seeking faster internal approval of proposed investments, escapebased OFDI is related to less aggressive acquisition strategies (DV
to aggregate target profitability)

H3.

Seeking faster internal approval of proposed investments, escape
based OFDI is related to less aggressive acquisition strategies (DV
to per share target profitability)

H4.

Seeking faster external acceptance of proposed investments, escapebased OFDI is related to higher premiums paid

H5.

Seeking faster external acceptance of proposed investments, escapebased OFDI is related to friendly target dispositions

H6.

Seeking faster external acceptance of proposed investments, escapebased OFDI is related to private target ownership
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H7.

Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to larger
targets

H8.

Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to targets with
higher market capitalizations

H9.

Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to smaller
deals (as a percentage of acquisition size)

H10. Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to lower target
intangible asset levels
Degree of Institutional Change and Deal Characteristics
A second natural follow-up question to whether a desire to escape institutional
change at home affects FDI conduct is whether the degree of change matters. While
Figure 6’s mathematical equivalence matrix is a useful conceptual tool that helps
illustrate how prospect theory may serve as a useful lens (yielding testable predictions
with respect to whether escape based foreign direct investment is a real phenomenon), it
does have one possible blind spot. Categorical jumps based on a categorical direction of
change (e.g., improving, deteriorating) do not consider precise magnitudes of change
within categories. For example, one country may experience a 10% deterioration in
terms of its institutional quality, as measured by various rating agencies, while another
country may experience a 30% deterioration. In both cases, however, the categorical
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change is minus one, despite the fact that one country deteriorated twice as much, on a
percentage basis, as the other. As studies of institutional effects on foreign direct
investment suggest that multinational enterprises consider the magnitude of change as
well (e.g., previously listed elasticity studies associated with various levels of taxation by
Bénassy-Quéré and colleagues), I now turn my attention to how degrees of change should
impact these decisions.
Here, I am not comparing firms with escape versus traditional FDI motives. Here
I simply ask, for example: will it matter if institutions deteriorate by 30% as opposed to
10%? Does the degree of change matter when comparing one escaping firm to another
escaping firm?
As Figure 5 shows, the slope of the value function for losses is steep. This
implies that the amount of discomfort associated with loss increases quite rapidly as
losses mount. As larger institutional deteriorations are presumably associated with the
potential for larger losses, this in turn suggests that the strength of escape motives, i.e.,
the desire to escape, will strengthen. Thus, I predict that when institutional situations at
home severely deteriorate, firms will, indeed, be even more motivated to leave than when
the deterioration is more modest. The picture, however, is a bit more complex than
simply assuming that the desire for a speedy exit is amplified. The literature suggests
that there is another factor to consider: the chance to recoup large economic loss.
One key prediction of prospect theory is that as losses magnify, firms eventually
become risk-seekers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). Kahneman and Tversky (1992)
famously note the “well-known observation that the tendency to bet on long shots
increases in the course of the betting day provides some support for the hypothesis that a
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failure to adapt to losses or to attain an expected gain induces risk seeking" (p. 286).
Thaler and Johnson (1990) notice something subtle, but very important, about Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1992) empirical evidence, and also about their horse track example:
The empirical demonstrations of risk seeking in the presence of
losses provided by Kahneman and Tversky were always accompanied by
an opportunity to get back to the original reference or "break-even" point.
We believe that this is very important…gambles, which offer the
opportunity to break even, will be found acceptable.
In analyzing the influence of break-even effects, the race track
example cited by Kahneman and Tversky is quite instructive. Notice that
neither a shift toward risk seeking nor the failure to adapt to losses is
sufficient to explain the preference toward betting on long shots at the end
of the betting day. A risk-seeking bettor who is behind by (say) $30 could
bet $30 on an even money favorite as a method of getting even. However,
the increased loss aversion produced by prior losses may render this
strategy unappealing. A $2 bet on a 15-1 long shot offers a more attractive
chance at breaking even because it does not risk losing significantly more
money.
More generally, we expect that when prior losses are present,
gambles which offer the prospect of changing the sign of the status of the
current account will be treated differently from those which do not. There
are several reasons, a priori, to expect options which offer the opportunity
to "break even" to be different. First, these gambles allow the decision
maker to cancel, or ignore, part of the outcomes. As Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) argue, cancellation supplies decision makers with an
appealing way of reducing problem complexity. When breaking even is
possible, integration is facilitated; thus, risk seeking in the domain of
losses should occur. (p. 656)
In other words, there is something especially motivating about gambles that have
the potential to help investors erase large losses. Referring to investments made by
managers in particular, Thaler and Johnson (1990) are clear: “Also, when options present
the opportunity to ‘break even’, tendencies toward risk-seeking in the domain of losses
might be enhanced…when there is a hope, however dim, that one might eradicate
existing losses” (p. 656).
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Again, the decision-making, psychology, biology, and neuroscience literatures
provide pathways leading from the prospect for loss towards a tendency for risk-seeking
in an attempt to prevent, or make up for, this loss. The basic path is as follows: the
degree of loss is directly related to the degree of stress and anxiousness felt by decisionmakers, which, in turn, is directly related to the intensity of motivation towards action
(Bechara et al., 2000; Busemeyer, 1982, 1985; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Damasio,
1994; Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983; Gray, 1999; Loewenstein & Cohen, 2008; Starcke &
Brand, 2012). Just as before, the broader management literature affirms this predicted
relationship. Das and Teng (2001) note that empirical studies showing that decision
makers weigh losses about twice as much as gains prompts risk-seeking conduct in an
attempt to recoup losses. Das and Teng (2001) go on to note that managers report taking
less risk when their companies are performing well (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986;
March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995), that “strategic decision making is strongly
affected by the positive or negative framing of decision scenarios”, and that, in short,
“troubled firms tend to take more risk” (p. 519).
This suggests that while a desire for quickly completed deals may assert itself
when managers first face institutional situations that may lead to loss, as situations
worsen and potential losses mount, the desire to break even becomes stronger and
stronger. Thus, I predict that firms in environments where institutions have degraded
markedly will adopt more aggressive investment strategies, by seeking targets that are a
bit more innovative, with higher earnings ‘upside’, as opposed to focusing primarily on
safer, conventional blue-chip companies. Invoking Rahm Emanuel’s maxim, “never let a
crisis go to waste”, advocates of such deals will take advantage of institutional crisis (and
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associated “we have to do something” attitudes) to gain internal acceptance of more
aggressive deals.
Note that I do not suggest that managers will chase risky upstarts. The goal is not
to chase firms that are extremely innovative (i.e., full-fledged explorers), but to acquire
innovative firms that can quickly monetize innovation (i.e., innovative exploiters). The
goal is high upside earnings, relative soon.
I therefore predict that the degree of change will reflect this rising importance of
trying to break even, meaning firms will gamble when the situation at home looks
especially poor. To be clear, I do not expect managers to gamble wildly (i.e., they will
not ignore economic fundamentals); but when they see potentially lucrative deals that are
‘good enough’, they will be more likely to gamble relative to managers in firms whose
institutional settings are less dire. This means moving more towards aggressive
investments in an attempt to break even with perceived economic losses.
In summary, for deal characteristics without a “breakeven” component, I expect
that the originally predicted desire for deals that can be completed quickly will strengthen
as the degree of institutional deterioration strengthens. For deals with a possible “break
even” component, however, I expect firms to exhibit more aggressive internationalization
behavior, with deal characteristics reflecting this change in attitude.
In order to bridge this sentiment with testable predictions, I examine pertinent
literature. Literature suggests that there is a sweet spot in terms of size when it comes to
the capacity for exploitative innovation. Very small firms might be highly innovative,
but at a more exploratory stage (Jansen et al., 2006). Thus, while I earlier predicted that
escaping firms would show a general preference for smaller targets (reflecting a desire to
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facilitate quick deals), I now predict that as degrees of institutional degradation get
worse, firms balance their desire for quick escapes with their desire to seek riskier deals
in an attempt to break even. This means that they will likely seek targets that are larger
than before. Public funding (associated with larger R&D budgets and higher degrees of
monetizing new products) and intangible assets (e.g., patents) are also related to
exploitative innovation (Jansen et al., 2006); here we see a case where my predicted
escape-based motive serves an antecedent of the traditional asset-exploitation motive
associated with the traditional market-seeking FDI motive.
More aggressive investment strategies, with firms focusing more on the upside
potential of acquisitions than on safety or value (e.g., seeking targets with higher
multiples of deal value to earnings), are also likely to be favored (Das & Teng, 2001;
Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Thus, I predict direct relationships between these
characteristics and the degree of institutional change.
Deal size – as a percentage of acquirer size – and friendly target dispositions seem
to lack obvious break-even potential. Thus, I predict that the original emphasis on
facilitating speedy deals will remain the primary focus, with degree of change amplifying
this desire. (In fact, given Thaler & Johnson’s [1990] suggestion that smaller “longshots” may be favored over larger investments, perhaps firms will now have two reasons
to prefer smaller deals.) Finally, the desire to buy firms with high earnings potentials,
while also facilitating quick acceptance, suggests a direct relationship between premiums
and degree of change. Thus, I suggest the following:
P3.

The degree of change matters, i.e., it is directly related to deal
characteristics with the potential to offer firms the ability to recoup
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perceived losses, and where no 'breakeven' component exists, it is
directly related to deal speed
H11. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with larger targets
H12. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with higher market capitalizations
H13. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with public target ownership
H14. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with higher levels of target intangible asset ownership
H15. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with more aggressive investment strategies (with
respect to aggregate target profits)
H16. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with more aggressive investment strategies (with
respect to per-share target profits)
H17. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with smaller relative deal sizes
H18. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with friendly target dispositions
H19. Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated
with targets with higher premiums
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Type of Institutional Change as a Moderator of Degree of Change and Deal
Characteristics
Here I examine whether the degree of change for escaping firms (based on lossavoidance motives) is more important than the degree of change for firms with traditional
FDI motives (based on the prospect of gain). In short, as PT suggests that loss aversion is
a stronger motive than gain seeking, I expect that degrees of change matter more for
firms seeking to escape a deteriorating home environment than for firms seeking gain
abroad. In other words, I expect each of the hypothesized effects from the previous
section to be stronger for escaping firms than they are for those seeking-gain. Thus, I
propose the following:
P4.

The degree of change matters more for firms from deteriorating
settings than it does for firms from static settings

H20. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with larger targets will be stronger for firms
with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking motives
H20. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with larger targets will be stronger for firms
with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking motives
H21. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with higher market capitalizations
will be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with
gain-seeking motives
H22. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with public target ownership will
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be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gainseeking motives
H23. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with higher levels of target
intangible asset ownership will be stronger for firms with an escape
motive versus firms with gain-seeking motives
H24. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with more aggressive investment
strategies (with respect to aggregate target profits) will be stronger
for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking
motives
H25. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with more aggressive investment
strategies (with respect to per-share target profits) will be stronger
for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking
motives
H26. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with smaller relative deal sizes
will be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with
gain-seeking motives
H27. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with friendly target dispositions
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will be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with
gain-seeking motives
H28. The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at
home are associated with targets with higher premiums will be
stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gainseeking motives
Figure 9 provides a conceptual model that summarizes my 4 major propositions
and 28 associated hypotheses. I will now describe how I plan to empirically test each of
these proposed links.

66

FDI
Propensity
(P1)

Target
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Target
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Aggressive
Book
Strategy
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Market
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(P2)
(Deteriorating or
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Targ EE
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Acq EBIT

Deal
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Degree of
Inst Ch (P3)

Acq CA
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Acq NA

(Escaping
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Target
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Acq TA
Targ EPS
Targ NI

Moderator (P4):
Effect of degree
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for firms w/
escape motives

Premium
Paid

Public
Target

NonFriendly

• (P1) Binomial
Proportionality Test
• (P2) PLS Path Model 1

Figure 9. Summary of Hypotheses (Mapped on to Propositions and Statistical Tests)
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• (P3, P4) PLS Path Model 2

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Research Design
In an attempt to facilitate clear understanding and prevent the reflexive adoption
of assumptions pertinent to other studies, but less pertinent when adopting a prospect
theory-based lens, I will first explain what this study is not.
First, it is not a study of prospect theory; it merely uses one of its key predictions
as a lens. Thus, I do not describe or implement prospect theory in its full mathematical
splendor, replete with precisely plotted value functions or explicit probability weights
attached to specific FDI decisions.
Second, I am not searching for new independent variables, hoping to add a bit of
incremental validity to existing foreign direct investment models.
Third, I am also not suggesting that foreign direct investment from ‘D’ settings
(deteriorating) is more likely to go to static settings (or to other deteriorating settings)
than to improving settings (or, in a static analysis, to simply the best institutional setting
available). I do not believe this to be true, and it is not the point of my test.
To be clear: the goal of this dissertation is not to predict where foreign direct
investment will go. I am merely saying that by purposely limiting the my scope of my
examination (i.e., by comparing only foreign direct investment that does go from either
‘D’ or 'S' settings to settings with similar magnitudes of categorical change), I can create
a test that may help us determine (via an examination of revealed, as opposed to stated,
preferences) if ‘escape’ is, indeed, a genuine motive for foreign direct investment for
some firms. And while this test is not definitive, it does represent an interesting first step
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that moves us beyond current analyses based on case studies or on empirical approaches
that do not attempt to account for traditional FDI motives.
The second element of my research design involves the adoption of a natural
experiment based approach. Social scientists are often envious of medical researchers in
labs, who are often able to rely upon simple T-Tests or Anova based analyses. Quite
simply, there is no need for more advanced statistical methods due to the strength of their
research designs. The common belief is that this approach is superior to approaches that
resort to statistically controlling for confounds. Unfortunately, this approach is often
unavailable to social scientists whose jobs often require the examination of 'messy, real
world’ secondary data. As I believe I have found a way to implement an experimental
research design while examining macro-level data, controls are thus handled primarily
via this design rather than via statistical methods.
Consider Fraker and Maynare (1987) and Lalonde (1986), who convinced many
social scientists that their ability to control for confounds via statistical methods was an
illusion, hence the wholesale shift – a shift not emulated by most management scholars –
towards natural experiment (and quasi-experiment) based studies (Shadish et al., 2002).
For example, social scientists may exploit naturally occurring changes in legal or
economic policy, either across time in the same location or at the same time across the
borders of two locations, “as if” they had structured these changes in order to purposely
conduct an experiment. The key is that one time or place (the period or place of change)
serves as a proxy for an experimental “treatment”, while the other time or place (the
period or place where change did not occur) serves as a “control”. The goal is to emulate
lab experiments (with the added realism inherent in field studies), where research
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designs, rather than post-hoc statistical controls, do the heavy lifting with regard to
potentially confounding variables or reverse causality.
According to the Research Methods Knowledge Base (Trochim, 1999: 193),
"experimental designs are often touted as the most 'rigorous' of all research designs or, as
the 'gold standard' against which all other designs are judged". One key feature of these
designs is their ability to increase the odds that: (a) treatment and control group
characteristics will be matched (i.e., equivalent), and (b) any residual mismatches will be
due to chance rather than due to systemic heterogeneity. As a result of their ability to
dampen, or even eliminate, the effects of omitted variable bias, such studies are thought
to have much stronger internal validity than the "correlational" studies typically
employed by business professors.
As researchers conducting natural experiments lack the degree of control
possessed by scientists in a lab, the likelihood that treatment and control groups are
equivalent is somewhat less than it might be had researchers possessed full control with
respect to the random assignment of treatments. Thus, more conservative researchers
employing this type of experimental design often conduct explicit checks of equivalence
to ensure that group equivalence has, indeed, been obtained (and if mismatches do
remain, they are acknowledged, corrected via reassignments, statistically controlled for,
and/or explicitly modeled) (Angrist et al., 2002; Bloom, 2010; Warner, 2008). These
checks for equivalence become even more important when designs possess quasiexperimental characteristics, i.e., designs where the degree of random assignment to
treatment and control groups is not unquestionably assured (even when assignments are
completely free from researcher influence), or is even absent entirely.
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In a recent Journal of International Business Studies “From the Editors” piece,
Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood (2012: 212) admonish the field for its reflexive
overreliance upon “observational data” and “cross-sectional regressions to make
inferences about the treatment effect”. They suggest natural experiments produce more
trustworthy results, and then go on to describe how a negative regulatory shock may
serve as a treatment period that can be compared to a control period not subject to the
shock, providing “ideal test environments”.
I examine such a shock in this study, via the employment of a special type of
natural experiment that is less prone to such issues: the case-crossover design, developed
by Harvard epidemiologists Maclure and Mittleman (1991). The term 'crossover' refers
to the fact that all subjects pass through (i.e., cross over) both treatment and control
phases before group counts or means are compared. (In this case, the same set of firms in
each country experiences both a deteriorating institutional phase and an institutionally
static phase.) The explicit purpose of this design is to control for non-focal differences
between control and treatment groups (i.e., omitted variables). As each subject
effectively serves as its own control before the standard group mean comparison takes
place, the New England Journal of Medicine's "Medical Uses of Statistics" (Louis et al.,
1992: 95) claims that "this pairing (of a subject with itself) represents the ultimate form
of statistical adjustment".
At its core, the design involves the examination of the same set of firms (thus
making this a case-crossover design) within temporally adjacent, spatially identical
settings in Latin America. In other words, I compare the foreign direct investment
behavior of:
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•

The same group of firms that have been exposed to a changing
institutional setting (to attenuate firm/industry effects)

•

Within the same countries (to attenuate country effects)

•

During periods of institutional transition that border neutral periods
(serving as treatment and control periods)

•

Irrespective of temporal precedence (in order to account for the global
trend of foreign direct investment increasing over the years)

For example, I compare outward foreign direct investment from Colombia during
1980-1985 (when labor institutions were ‘deteriorating’) with Colombian outward
foreign direct investment during 1985-1990 (when these same institutions were ‘static’),
while imposing mathematical similarity according to my prospect theory-derived
predictions (e.g., destinations in each case that similarly represent a +1 change).
Similarly, if institutions in Brazil (or any other Latin American country) deteriorated
during any five-year treatment period that bordered a static five year control period, I
compared outward foreign direct investment from those adjacent periods as well.
Despite the acknowledged strength of case-crossover designs in terms of their
ability to control for group differences, as a precautionary measure I chose to conduct Ttests (for quantitative variables) and Fisher's Exact Test (for categorical variables) to
verify that common antecedents of internationalization did not differ by subsample (i.e.,
firms in deteriorating setting were compared with firms in static home settings). I
compared the two groups with respect to 16 measures of four attributes that the
internationalization literature (e.g., Hitt et al.'s 2006 meta-analysis) has identified as
antecedents of FDI activity:
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•

T-tests were conducted to verify that firm size was equivalent (specific
measures included net sales, net income, net assets, total assets, EBIT,
EBITDA)

•

T-tests were conducted to verify that the capability of firms to expand
(typically measured via proxies for liquidity or monetary capability) was
equivalent (specific measures included current assets as a percentage of
the preceding size measures)

•

T-tests were conducted to verify that firm experience was equivalent
(specific measures included dummy coded variables dependent upon
whether firms had conducted past deals in the host country, in the same
industry, or both)

•

Fisher's Exact Test was conducted for these same dummy-coded macrolevel industry variables, to determine if industry composition differed by
subsample

None of the test statistics was statistically significant at the .05 level (the average
p-value was .35), indicating that there were no mismatches between the treatment and
control groups. I thus concluded that the samples were equivalent with respect to
variables that the literature suggests that researchers control for (beyond the four
traditional FDI motives, whose influence is accounted for via theoretically derived
samples according to PT informed predictions).
In a future critique of this design, Maclure and Mittleman (2000) warn that the
design applies best if treatments and effects are clear, discrete, and abrupt, and if the
effect on risk is immediate. This study meets each of these ideal conditions of suitability:
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examined institutional changes happen within a single period (as opposed to creeping
changes over a series of decades), its applicability in each case is immediate, and the
proposed outcome of escape is discrete and abrupt (with a firm either staying or
escaping).
Data and Measures
Despite a recent downturn in global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity,
M&As have historically accounted for the lion’s share of historical foreign direct
investment activity (for example, according to UNCTAD data, during the 20 years
between 1987 and 2006, M&A activity as a share of global IFDI averaged over 75% and
dipped below 50% only once). Thus, I chose to examine M&A activity instead of
greenfield ventures, pulling data from Thomson One’s Mergers and Acquisitions
database.
Latin America was the fastest growing region in the world in terms of both inward
and outward foreign direct investment in 2009 [ECLAC, 2010]. While the temporal
scope of this test included deals announced during 1986-2005, this recent upsurge,
combined with a relative lack of Latin American focused studies, prompted me to choose
to examine Latin America.
In line with much of the literature on how institutions affect the conduct or
performance of multinational enterprises (e.g., Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2013; Phene &
Tallman, 2012), data on institutions was obtained via a central, normalized index
compiled by the Fraser Institute that measures institutional quality in various categories,
e.g., legal institutions, financial institutions, etc. (Gwartney et al., 2012). Data is
provided for countries on a rolling five-year basis. My sample included data from 1986
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to 2005. Ultimate sources of data that the Fraser Institute relied upon to construct their
index include databases commonly utilized by IB scholars, e.g., databases created and
maintained by the IMF, the United Nations, the World Bank, etc.
Institutional changes that occurred in periods of deterioration that bordered static
periods were observed in the following areas: Bureaucracy Costs, Hiring and Firing
Rules, Price Controls, Credit Market Regulations, Private Credit, Government Size,
Impartial Courts, Judicial Independence, Legal System Integrity, Political/Military Risk,
Property Rights, Banking Regulation, Foreign Currency Rules, Interest Rate Controls,
Monetary Soundness, Money Growth, and Trade Regulations. Table 3 provides a
detailed description of these institutional categories and an inventory of the ultimate
sources of data that the Fraser Institute consulted to create its measures of institutional
quality.
Traditional foreign direct investment motives (e.g., market-seeking foreign direct
investment) are accounted for by my prospect theory centered methodology, which
assumes that these motives coexist with escape-based motives, i.e., motives either exist
simultaneously, or once the decision to escape has been made, traditional motives exert
themselves then. (For example, once a firm decides to invest abroad, it may naturally
consider destinations with lucrative markets or key natural resources.)
Under the supposition that institutional deterioration leads to misalignment (Witt
and Lewin, 2007), categories are defined as follows: a 10% improvement or decrease in
the Fraser Institute’s respective institutional index score will result in the labeling of a
country’s institutions as improving or deteriorating respectively, while a change of less
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Table 3
Description of Institutions and Sources
Domain

Specific Area

Description

Ultimate Data Sources

Business
Regulations

Bureaucracy
Costs

This is a survey-based measure of
firms' assessments of how
burdensome regulations related to
products, services, energy use, and
non-environmental are in a given
country.

World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report

Business
Regulations

Hiring and
Firing Rules

This measures the degree of labor
market rigidity in a country with
respect to a firm's level of
autonomy in terms of its ability to
hire or fire employees.

World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report

Price Controls

This measures the degree to which
governments interfere with the
ability of a firm to autonomously
set prices via the formal
specification of allowable prices
for goods or services (e.g., price
floors, price ceilings).

International Institute for Management
Development World Competitiveness
Yearbook, Price Waterhouse Doing Business In
series, World Bank Adjustment in Africa:
Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead (1994),
Economist Intelligence Unit EIU Country
Reports and Country Commerce (2001), US
(table continues)
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Table 3 (Continued)
Description of Institutions and Sources
Domain

Specific Area

Description

Ultimate Data Sources

Business
Regulations

State Department Country Commercial Guides
and Country Reports on Economic Policy and
Trade Practices

Financial

Credit Market
Regulations

This is a broad measure of how
well developed and free from
government interference a
country's credit markets are.

World Bank World Development Indicators,
International
Monetary Fund International Financial
Statistics, Bank Regulation and Supervision
(Barth, Caprio & Levine, various years),
Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels
Govern (Barth, Caprio & Levine, 2006)

Financial

Private Credit

This is a measure of the extent to
which government borrowing
crowds out borrowing by firms.

World Bank World Development Indicators,
International
Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics

Fiscal

Government
Size

Measures the degree that countries
rely on political processes to
allocate resources (including
goods and services). Increased
government spending (relative to
private spending) results in
government decision-making and
spending crowding out private
autonomy and spending.

World Bank World Development Indicators,
International Monetary Fund International
Financial Statistics, United Nations National
Accounts

(table continues)
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Table 3 (Continued)
Description of Institutions and Sources
Domain

Specific Area

Description

Ultimate Data Sources

Legal

Impartial Courts

This measures the degree of
neutrality, efficiency, and lack of
corruption with respect to a
country's legal framework for
private dispute settlement and the
ability of firms to challenge the
legality of government actions
and/or regulations.

World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report, World Bank
Worldwide Governance Indicators

Legal

Judicial
Independence

This is a measure of how free
courts are from the influence of
powerful others, e.g., political
influence via government agencies
or officials.

World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report

Legal

Legal System
Integrity

This measure consists of two
components related to law and
order. The ‘law’ component
assesses a legal system's degree of
impartiality and general strength,
while the ‘order’ component
assesses popular observance of
laws.

PRS Group International Country Risk Guide

Legal

Political/Military This is a measure of political risk
Risk
that includes the degree of

PRS Group International Country Risk Guide,
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
(table continues)
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Table 3 (Continued)
Description of Institutions and Sources
Domain

Specific Area

Description

Ultimate Data Sources

influence that military officials
have with respect to government
policies that might affect firms by
creating an "uneasy" operating
environment.
Legal

Property Rights

This is a measure of how well
specified and secure property
rights are. When actors lack
confidence with respect to
property rights, investment and
entrepreneurial activity suffer.

World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report

Monetary

Banking
Regulation

This is an interval measure of the
percentage of bank deposits that
are held in privately owned banks
within a country. When countries
mandate deposits in public
accounts,

Bank Regulation and Supervision (Barth, Caprio
& Levine, various years), Rethinking Bank
Regulation: Till Angels Govern (Barth, Caprio
& Levine, 2006)

Monetary

Foreign
Currency Rules

This is a measure of the degree of
restriction with respect to a firm’s
ability to own foreign currency
bank accounts both domestically
and abroad.

International Monetary Fund Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions

(table continues)
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Table 3 (Continued)
Description of Institutions and Sources
Domain

Specific Area

Description

Ultimate Data Sources

Monetary

Interest Rate
Controls

Data on regulations and controls
World Bank World Development Indicators,
related to interest rates is used to
International Monetary Fund International
construct an index measuring the
Financial Statistics
degree to which markets determine
rates, the degree of stability of
monetary policy, and the degree to
which real deposit and lending
rates are positive.

Monetary

Monetary
Soundness

This is a measure of how stable
monetary institutions are.
Fluctuating or perpetually low
monetary value lowers investment
and entrepreneurial activity by
undermining confidence in the
means of exchange, trade, and the
financing of production.

World Bank World Development Indicators,
International
Monetary Fund International Financial
Statistics, United Nations National Accounts,
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions

Monetary

Money Growth

Excessive monetary growth
reduces confidence in the means of
exchange and investment within a
country, as purchasing power

World Bank World Development Indicators,
International
Monetary Fund International Financial
Statistics, United Nations National Accounts
(table continues)
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Table 3 (Continued)
Description of Institutions and Sources
Domain

Specific Area

Description

Ultimate Data Sources

erodes and planning for the future
becomes difficult; it also acts as de
facto expropriation of private
property.
Trade

Trade
Regulations

Supply chains today are global.
Trade restrictions impede the
ability of firms to compete with
competitors whose countries lack
such restrictions. Firms also suffer
when the cost of inputs (e.g.,
tariffs increasing a firm's costs of
acquiring an input) or outputs
(e.g., tariffs resulting in higher
prices for consumers may hurt
sales relative to cheaper
alternatives) is artificially raised
beyond optimal levels.
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International Monetary Fund Government
Finance Statistics Yearbook, International
Monetary Fund International Financial
Statistics, World Trade Organization World
Tariff Profiles, World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report, World Bank Doing
Business, MRI Bankers’ Guide to Foreign
Currency, International Monetary Fund, Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions, Robert Lawson and
Jayme Lemke, Travel Visas, Public Choice
(2011)

than 5% will result in the labeling of a country’s institutional situation as static.
Conflicting periods (i.e., periods where heterogeneous institutional states made clear
categorical assignments difficult, e.g., financial institutions deteriorated while legal
institutions improved) were excluded.
Table 4 provides a detailed list of the institutional settings that emerged using this
criterion. This approach ultimately yielded 80 distinct periods where institutionally
deteriorating treatment periods bordered static control periods, resulting in 40 includable
country dyads (e.g., Colombia from 1991-1995 [when labor institutions were static] and
Colombia from 1996-2000 [when labor institutions were deteriorating]). The average
degree of home country deterioration (for deals that originated from countries with
deteriorating settings) was 23.1%. The average degree of change during neutral periods
was 0%. The average degree of host country improvement (for deals that originated from
neutral settings that were bound for improving settings) was 24.9%.
All M&A deals under examination had announcement dates and home-country
locations that fell within the domain of these dyads. (For example, deals from Colombia
that were announced in either the 1991-1995 time period or the 1996-2000 time period
were included in the examination, while deals not falling within the domain of a focal
dyad – e.g., Colombian M&A activity in 1989 – were excluded.) Investments ultimately
took place in the following regions: Caribbean, Central America, Eastern Europe, North
America, South America, South Asia, North Asia, and Western Europe.
In an attempt to "reduce noise in the data", examinations of M&A activity (e.g.,
Seth, Song & Pettit's 2002 Strategic Management Journal study) typically limit analysis
to deals where pertinent information with respect to deal characteristics is available and
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Table 4
Institutional Settings Examined for Test of Escape – P1/H1
Dyad
#
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
9
10
10
11
11

Institutional
Setting
Bahamas
Bahamas
Barbados
Barbados
Barbados
Barbados
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Brazil
Brazil
Chile
Chile
Chile
Chile
Chile
Chile
Colombia
Colombia
Costa Rica
Costa Rica

SubRegion
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
Central America
Central America

First
Year
1991
1996
1991
1996
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1991
1996
1996
2001
1996
2001
1991
1996
1991
1996

Last
Year
1995
2000
1995
2000
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
1995
2000
2000
2005
2000
2005
1995
2000
1995
2000

Institutional
Domain
Monetary
Monetary
Monetary
Monetary
Monetary
Monetary
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Labor
Labor
Legal
Legal
Business Regs
Business Regs
Labor
Labor
Financial
Financial

Specific
Area
Money Growth
Money Growth
Money Growth
Money Growth
Money Growth
Money Growth
Political/Military Risk
Political/Military Risk
Legal System Integrity
Legal System Integrity
Judicial Independence
Judicial Independence
Hiring and Firing Regs
Hiring and Firing Regs
Political/Military Risk
Political/Military Risk
Price Controls
Price Controls
Hiring and Firing Regs
Hiring and Firing Regs
Credit Market Regs
Credit Market Regs

Percent
Change
0.0%
-13.8%
2.2%
-15.1%
-15.1%
-2.5%
-15.3%
0.0%
-28.6%
0.0%
-1.8%
-45.5%
0.0%
-18.8%
-10.7%
3.0%
-10.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-23.6%
4.7%
-13.5%

(table continues)
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Table 4 (Continued)
Institutional Settings Examined for Test of Escape – P1/H1
Dyad
#
12
12
13
13
14
14
15
15
16
16
17
17
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
21
22
22

Institutional
Setting

SubRegion

First
Year

Last
Year

Institutional
Domain

Specific
Area

Percent
Change

Dominican Rep
Dominican Rep
Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
Guatemala
Guatemala
Guatemala
Guatemala
Guatemala
Guatemala
Guatemala
Guatemala
Guyana
Guyana
Haiti
Haiti
Haiti
Haiti
Jamaica
Jamaica

Caribbean
Caribbean
South America
South America
South America
South America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
South America
South America
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean

1991
1996
1986
1991
1996
2001
1991
1996
1991
1996
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1991
1996

1995
2000
1990
1995
2000
2005
1995
2000
1995
2000
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
1995
2000

Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Monetary
Monetary
Monetary
Monetary
Financial
Financial
Trade
Trade
Financial
Financial
Fiscal
Fiscal
Legal
Legal
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial

Property Rights
Property Rights
Property Rights
Property Rights
Monetary Soundness
Monetary Soundness
Foreign Currency Regs
Foreign Currency Regs
Credit Market Regs
Credit Market Regs
Trade Regulations
Trade Regulations
Private Credit
Private Credit
Government Size
Government Size
Property Rights
Property Rights
Private Credit
Private Credit
Private Credit
Private Credit

-13.5%
2.2%
0.0%
-15.2%
-24.6%
-4.1%
0.0%
-50.0%
4.9%
-15.3%
-11.1%
0.0%
-10.4%
3.5%
-13.6%
0.0%
0.0%
-30.8%
-1.0%
-13.1%
-11.0%
0.0%

(table continues)
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Table 4 (Continued)
Institutional Settings Examined for Test of Escape – P1/H1
Dyad
#
23
23
24
24
25
25
26
26
27
27
28
28
29
29
30
30
31
31
32
32
33
33

Institutional
Setting

SubRegion

First
Year

Last
Year

Institutional
Domain

Specific
Area

Percent
Change

Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Panama
Panama
Panama
Panama
Panama
Panama
Panama
Panama
Paraguay
Paraguay
Peru
Peru
Trinidad & Tob
Trinidad & Tob

North America
North America
North America
North America
North America
North America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
South America
South America
South America
South America
Caribbean
Caribbean

1986
1991
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1986
1991
1991
1996
1996
2001
1996
2001
1991
1996
1996
2001
1986
1991

1990
1995
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
1990
1995
1995
2000
2000
2005
2000
2005
1995
2000
2000
2005
1990
1995

Monetary
Monetary
Business Regs
Business Regs
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Monetary
Monetary
Financial
Financial
Trade
Trade
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Financial
Financial

Foreign Currency Regs
Foreign Currency Regs
Bureaucy Costs
Bureaucy Costs
Impartial Courts
Impartial Courts
Impartial Courts
Impartial Courts
Money Growth
Money Growth
Private Credit
Private Credit
Trade Regs
Trade Regs
Legal System Integrity
Legal System Integrity
Property Rights
Property Rights
Legal System Integrity
Legal System Integrity
Interest Rate Controls
Interest Rate Controls

0.0%
-50.0%
3.3%
-39.7%
2.0%
-26.9%
-2.3%
-54.8%
-1.0%
-10.2%
0.0%
-10.8%
-13.2%
3.8%
-28.6%
0.0%
-4.4%
-11.6%
-28.6%
0.0%
-25.0%
0.0%

(table continues)
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Table 4 (Continued)
Institutional Settings Examined for Test of Escape – P1/H1
Dyad
#
34
34
35
35
36
36
37
37
38
38
39
39
40
40

Institutional
Setting

SubRegion

First
Year

Last
Year

Institutional
Domain

Specific
Area

Percent
Change

Trinidad & Tob
Trinidad & Tob
Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Venezuela
Venezuela
Venezuela
Venezuela
Venezuela
Venezuela

Caribbean
Caribbean
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America

1996
2001
1986
1991
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001
1996
2001

2000
2005
1990
1995
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005

Legal
Legal
Financial
Financial
Legal
Legal
Financial
Financial
Fiscal
Fiscal
Legal
Legal
Labor
Labor

Impartial Courts
Impartial Courts
Interest Rate Controls
Interest Rate Controls
Property Rights
Property Rights
Banking Regs
Banking Regs
Government Size
Government Size
Property Rights
Property Rights
Hiring and Firing Regs
Hiring and Firing Regs

-3.1%
-17.5%
0.0%
-25.0%
-1.7%
-10.5%
0.0%
-60.0%
-1.6%
-18.3%
-2.6%
-16.2%
4.5%
-63.0%
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Figure 10. Institutional Settings Examined For “Deal Characteristics” Hypotheses (Associated With P2-P4)
Note: This is a “full information” subset of the list of settings examined in Table 4. The institutional settings in this
subset had cross-border deals take place that met each the following four conditions:
(1) The acquiring firm’s home country was in a period of institutional deterioration (D) that bordered a
static (S) institutional period, or vice versa
(2) The categorical change from D settings and S settings with respect to target country institutional settings
was set to be equal, e.g., per Figure 6, FDI from D to S settings and from S to improving (I) settings
both represent a categorical jump of +1
(3) Deal values were at least 1 million USD in size
(4) Full information with respect to key financial values (e.g., deal value, net income) was available
A robustness check on H1 was also performed using deals from this pared sample.
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deal values meets a certain size threshold (i.e., very small deals are excluded). I thus
restricted my examination to transactions where acquiring firms had publicly agreed to
deals of at least 1 million USD in value. This ultimately resulted in an initial sample that
included 548 acquisitions, whose institutional state (deteriorating or static) could be
compared in order to test Hypothesis 1.
The sample includes a mix of investments from dyads where deteriorating periods
preceded static periods, and also from dyads where static periods preceded deteriorating
periods. This is important, because as time has gone by, the global economy has become
more integrated, and firms in emerging markets have become larger and more capable of
moving abroad. For example, according to the KOF Index of Globalization (2013), Latin
America's globalization rating increased from 41% from 1985 to 2005. The fact that
deteriorating periods in my sample preceded neutral periods roughly 2/3 of the time
indicates that any increase in FDI activity was not due to these temporal trends. (In other
words, if deteriorating periods consistently occurred after neutral periods, then claims
that deterioration led to increases in OFDI could be countered with assertions that these
increases were instead due to the global trend of rising OFDI in recent years. Thus, the
tendency in this sample for deteriorating periods to precede neutral periods, when global
trends strongly suggest that later periods will see increased OFDI activity, provides a
strong, conservative test of the effect of deterioration on OFDI.)
In order to test the remaining hypotheses, more detailed financial information was
required. I thus restricted my examination here to transactions with fully available net
income and deal value information. As a result, many smaller deals, often emanating
from smaller countries, were excluded. This subset included 174 deals. Figure 10
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visually depicts the subset of dyads from Table 4 that was used to test these hypotheses.
(H1 was also tested again, using this “full information” subset as opposed to the broader
set of deals, as a robustness check.)
I operationalize outward foreign direct investment propensity as the number of
M&A deals announced during each contiguous time-period. Theoretically relevant deal
characteristics were obtained by Thomson One's database, with measures based on
previous conceptualizations in the literature (e.g., Reed et al., 2007). Premiums represent
deal values in excess of a target's current stock-price based valuation on the day of the
deal. Public represents whether a target is publicly traded or privately owned (1 =
public). Both of these variables are directly provided by Thomson One.
TargSize represents how large a target is. This is a latent variable measured by
Thomson One’s reported figures with respect to the number of employees a target has
and its total net sales. DealSize is the value of the deal on the day it was announced,
relative to the size of the buyer. This is a latent variable measured by calculating the deal
value in U.S. dollars as a percentage of an acquirer’s: net assets, total assets, current
assets, net income, net sales, and EBIT. Each of these indicators (i.e., deal value as a
percentage of net assets, deal value as a percentage of net sales, etc.) was calculated via
direct figures from Thomson One.
TargIntAss is the level of intangible assets (e.g., patents and other intellectual
property) owned by the target on the day the deal was announced, as reported by
Thomson One. Non-friendly is a dummy variable, with 1 indicating that the target's
disposition with respect to being acquired – as reported by Thomson One – was either
hostile or neutral, and 0 indicating that the target's disposition was welcoming.
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TargMktValue is the target's market capitalization on the day the deal was announced.
AggBook and AggMarket measure whether or not the acquirer was pursuing a more
conservative value-oriented purchase strategy or a more aggressive growth-oriented
strategy. These variables are operationalized by examining the deal value as a multiple
of target earnings, either on an aggregate basis (AggBook: deal value as a multiple of net
income and EBIT) or on a per share basis (AggMarket: deal value as a multiple of
earnings per share).
Finally, the degree of change is simply the percent change in a country's
institutional rating, e.g., if a country’s institutional score in the monetary institutions
category changes by +20%, then the magnitude of change is +20% (and if the change in a
country's monetary institutions score is -20%, then the degree of change is noted as 20%).
I calculate cumulative D-sourced and S-sourced foreign direct investment using
the following formulas, where ‘x’ and 'y' represent an individual country in each
respective category :

Combining the formulas yields the prediction seen in Figure 11's conceptual
illustration: the number of FDI deals (i.e., FDI propensity) from deteriorating settings
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X = FDI from D settings

X = FDI from D settings

Y = FDI from S settings

Y = FDI from S settings

Figure 11. Illustrations of Predicted Effect of Misalignment on Firm Conduct

will exceed the number of FDI deals from static settings (regardless of which period
occurred first).
Statistical Methodology
In order to analyze the data and test my hypotheses, I employed two primary
statistical methods: a binomial proportionality test and partial least squares (partial least
squares) analysis. One problem related to the testing of Hypothesis 1 is potential
endogeneity associated with the inclusion both FDI Type (a dummy variable indicating
whether FDI originated from a deteriorating or static environment) and the dependent
variable, FDI propensity (the number of deals from each environment), in the same path
model. Overlapping compositional attributes (with one being a function of the number of
occurrences of the other) generally suggests the use of econometric techniques such as
the employment of instrumental variables, when they are available. Due to the lack of
suitable instruments, I thus employ a binomial proportionality test to determine if
outward foreign direct investment propensity differs according to foreign direct
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investment type. Kelly et al. (1987), Kumar (2005), Lee and Larwood (1983),
McDougall and Oviatt (1996), McNamara et al. (1997), Seth et al. (2000), and Wiles and
Danielova (2009) suggest that binomial proportionality tests are appropriate when
attempting to determine the statistical significance of deviations from theoretically
expected distributions of observations into two categories.)
As this is a bivariate test, I relied upon experimental controls for potential
confounds. As noted earlier, T-tests and Fisher's Exact Test verified that samples were
equivalent with respect to 16 established measures of internationalization antecedents.
Thus, after verifying sample equivalence with respect to potential confounds, I conducted
the binomial test. This helped me achieve my primary goal of determining if institutional
misalignment motivates escape via a quantitative empirical analysis that accounts for the
strong likelihood of either simultaneous (or near simultaneous) consideration of
traditional foreign direct investment motives on the part of decision makers within
multinational enterprises. (The test predicts that proportions, under an assumption of
economic rationality, will be roughly equal given equalized categorical outcomes. A
significant p-value (indicating that FDI activity differs according to whether it originates
from deteriorating versus neutral settings) would support the assertion that motives
related to the avoidance of loss (i.e., escape motives) do indeed exist.
After testing for whether escape actually occurs, I delved into the examination of
hypotheses related to characteristics of escape-based foreign investment. Here I
conducted a partial least squares analysis, as it is often deemed appropriate for studies
that are exploratory in nature and for situations where dichotomous variables are
employed, and/or researchers wish to maximize prediction over fit (Chin, 1998; Chin,
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2003; Fey et al., 2008; Lee, at al., 2006; Van Slyke et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2011). PLS
is also often recommended for use when sample sizes are relatively small. For example,
a common rule of thumb with respect to required sample sizes when conducting analyses
via partial least squares-based methods suggests a sample of at least 10 times the number
of paths or indicators of the most predicted construct (Chin, 1998). As my most
predicted construct has two paths leading into it (all indicators are reflective), this means
that, in theory, a sample size as small as 20 might be large enough to detect mediumsized effects. As my actual sample size is 174, sample size is not an issue.
(By comparison, guidelines related to suggested sample sizes when conducting
analyses based on structural equation modeling approaches suggest the need for much
larger sample sizes – especially under circumstances similar to those in this examination,
where experimental controls parse out the effects of potential confounding variables
[meaning ultimate effect sizes should be smaller]. For example, to detect an effect size of
.05, in a model with 3 latent variables and 18 observed variables, with a p-value of .05
and .80 power, a sample size of 1172 is recommended when conducting structural
equation modeling-based analyses [Cohen, 1988; Soper, 2013; Westland, 2010]).
I used PLS-Graph 3.0 to generate two path models. The first model’s primary
focus, in line with the hypotheses associated with Proposition 2, was to test whether
having an escape motive changed deal characteristics. This model also examined the
effect of the absolute degree of institutional change (either deterioration at home or
improvement abroad) on deal characteristics.
The second model examined the subsamples (firms from either deteriorating or
static home countries) in isolation, in order to determine the effects of the degree of
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institutional deterioration on deal characteristics (in accordance with the hypotheses
associated with Proposition 3). I also wished to determine if OFDI motives associated
with each subsample (avoiding loss at home due to institutional deterioration, i.e.,
escaping, versus having traditional motives) served as a moderator. (The prediction is
that the degree of change mattered more for firms with an escape motive.)
Question “4” in Figure 7 suggests that discrete analysis is required. As interaction
terms produce single effects in lieu of main effects, and single effects assume that the
partner term (i.e., the other independent variable that is multiplied with the focal variable
in order to create the interaction term) has a value of zero, the interaction approach does
not make sense, conceptually. (Assuming that the degree of change, for example, was
equal to zero defeats the purpose of examining the impact of change.) Therefore, I used
the subgroup analysis approach at determining whether FDI motive moderated the effect
of institutional change on the deal characteristics under study.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
I offered four basic propositions (the desire to escape deteriorating institutional
settings is a genuine FDI motive, escape motives affect deal characteristics, degree of
change matters, and degree of change matters more for escaping firms versus those with
traditional FDI motives) and 28 associated hypotheses. In short, I find that escape does
happen and that it does affect deal characteristics. I also find that degree does matter.
Support for my prediction that it matters more for escaping firms is generally supportive
but ultimately inconclusive. Results regarding my hypotheses are listed below.
Escape Prompts OFDI Decisions
I conducted a binomial proportionality test (with experimental controls for firm,
industry, country, and temporal effects) to determine if this difference was statistically
significant. Binomial tests compare the counts and associated proportions of the
members of one group versus another. The complete sample of acquisitions consisted of
305 deals from deteriorating settings versus 243 deals from static settings, with FDI 26%
more likely to originate from deteriorating settings. As the p-value generated by the
proportions test was .001, H1 is clearly supported. As a robustness check, a binomial
tests was also conducted on the “full information” subset. Here, there were 107 deals
from deteriorating versus 67 deals from neutral settings (after imposing categorical
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Figure 12. Path Model Statistics
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Figure 13. Impact of Degree of Change on Firms with Traditional vs. Escape Motives
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Table 5
Correlations, Convergent Validity, and Discriminant Validity
Degree
Ch
DegreeCh

Public

Nonfriendly

Deal
Size

Premium

Esc

Agg
Book

Agg
Market

Targ
Size

Targ
MktC

TargInt
Ass

1

Public

-0.055

1

Non-friendly

-0.121

0.105

1

DealSize

-0.12

0.081

0.227

0.999

Premium

-0.113

0.097

0.219

-0.073

1

EscMotive

0.185

-0.096

-0.112

-0.137

0.097

1

AggBook

-0.027

-0.036

-0.002

0.003

-0.184

-0.096

0.876

AggMarket

0.021

-0.066

-0.101

0.006

-0.216

-0.114

0.072

1

TargSize

0.272

-0.053

-0.138

-0.089

-0.109

0.289

0.067

-0.002

0.634

TargMktCap

-0.075

-0.194

-0.098

-0.01

0.038

0.093

0.183

0.174

-0.052

1

TargIntAss

0.033

0.108

0.104

0.088

-0.087

-0.126

0.004

-0.07

-0.237

-0.043

Note: AVE listed along diagonal (n=174).
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Table 6
Outer Model Weights and Loadings
Outer
Weight

T-Statistic

Significance
Level

Outer
Loading

T-Statistic

Significance
Level

Deal Size:
DVpoAebit
DVpoANA
DVpoANI
DVpoATA
DVpoANS
DVmoACA

0.1675
0.1682
0.1628
0.1688
0.167
0.1663

2.7003
2.7756
3.5509
2.7284
3.907
3.9351

0.01
0.01
0.001
0.01
0.001
0.001

0.9998
0.9999
0.9979
0.9999
0.9999
0.9993

8.2981
11.7945
5.3268
13.0074
9.5742
5.0876

0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

Aggressive Strategy 1:
DVmoTNI
DVmoTebit

0.6439
0.4187

3.0317
1.9785

0.01
0.05

0.9623
0.9083

7.8652
6.1036

0.001
0.001

Target Size:
TNS
Tee

0.4174
0.7929

3.1832
8.921

0.001
0.001

0.6535
0.9172

3.7382
21.1009

0.001
0.001
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mathematical equivalence per Figure 6), with FDI a full 60% more likely to originate
from deteriorating countries. A p-value of less than .001 also supports H1.
Escape Motive and Deal Characteristics
All indicators load properly and latent variables exhibit requisite convergent and
discriminant validity (see Tables 5 and 6 for details). Loadings for deal size are
especially high, and all pertinent indicators were retained, as opposed to adopting
dimension reduction rules based on scree plot or Eigen value analysis. According to
Geffen (2005), when using PLS rather than SEM, higher loadings are expected (i.e., the
loadings shown may have been in the .8 range had I used SEM), and a more holistic
treatment of instruments may be preferable to rote adherence to strict dimension
reduction rules (MacCallum & Austin, 2000; Straub et al., 2004).
As Figure 12 and Tables 6 and 7 show, all predicted main effects are supported
(via PLS analysis) except for the predicted links between firms having an escape motive
preferring both public targets and targets with more tangible assets. While coefficient
signs for these two links were consistent with the proposed direction, each path had a pvalue of .108, indicating that they fall short of the minimal cutoff for statistical
significance. Remaining paths were statistically significant at various levels (.001, .01,
.05, and .1).
Degree of Change and Deal Characteristics
Figure 13 and Tables 7 and 8 report detailed results regarding how the degree of
change affects deals. Eight of nine predicted effects were statistically significant (the link
with target intangible assets was again not found to be a statistically significant
predictor). Two of these effects, however (related to premiums and market cap), had
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effects in the opposite of the proposed direction. It seems that firms do not pay higher
premiums for highly valued firms. Perhaps, as Simon and Johnson (1990) suggest,
overpaying to acquire targets is contrary to the proposed goal of recouping loss. Thus,
much like Kahenman and Tversky’s (1982) horse-bettors, while firms do seek targets
with high earnings upside, overpaying for overvalued firms is something they actively try
to avoid.
Type of Change as a Moderator of Degree of Change and Deal Characteristics
Figure 13, Table 7, and Table 8 report my findings with respect to moderation.
Results here are mixed. In terms of statistical significance, a subgroup analysis
examining one type of firm at a time (firms with escape vs. traditional motives) clearly
shows that degree of change matters more for escaping firms: eight of nine proposed
links here were found to be significant, versus just two for firms with traditional motives.
When coefficient differences are examined, however, just four of nine proposed
differences are statistically significant. And one of these four, premium, is significant in
the opposite of the proposed direction. Market capitalization, while not statistically
significant, also exhibits a coefficient whose sign is the opposite of the proposed
direction. This mirrors similar findings from the previous section.
Of note is the impact that separating effects by motive has on explanatory power.
One reason that effect sizes were smaller in Figure 12 versus Figure 13 is that weak and
non-significant effects of traditional motives attenuated stronger effects of escape
motives. For example, the effect (R-squared) of the degree of change on target size
increases from .13 to .34 when examining firms with escape motives in isolation.
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Table 7
Summary of Proposed Versus Actual Relationships
P1: Escape
Motive
Propensity
Predicted

P1:
Logic

P1: Escape Motive
Proensity Actual

P2: Escape
Motive Deal
Char. Predicted

P2:
Logic

P2: Escape Motive
Deal Char Actual

Propensity

+

Loss Aversion

+

n/a

n/a

n/a

AggBook

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

Speed

-

AggMarket

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

Speed

-

TargIntAss

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

Speed

- (ns)

Public

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

Speed

- (ns)

TargSize

n/a

n/a

n/a

+

Speed

+

TargMktValue

n/a

n/a

n/a

+

Speed

+

Deal Size

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

Speed

-

Non-Friendly

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

Speed

-

Premium

n/a

n/a

n/a

+

Speed

+

DV

(table continues)
Note: P-Value for propensity difference between firms with or without an escape motive < .001
Significance levels for other hypotheses listed in Table 7
Final Count: Predicted = Actual Direction (Statistically Significant): 24 (18)
Predicted ≠ Actual Direction (Statistically Significant): 4 (2)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Summary of Proposed Versus Actual Relationships
P4: Deg
Ch Esc
vs. Trad
Predicte
d

P4:
Logic

P4: Deg Ch Esc vs.
Trad Actual

P3: Deg Ch
Esc Motive
Predicted

P3:
Logic

P3: Deg Ch
Esc Motive
Actual

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

AggBook

+

Breakeven

+

+

Breakeven

+

AggMarket

+

Breakeven

+

+

Breakeven

+ (ns)

TargIntAss

+

Breakeven

+ (ns)

+

Breakeven

- (ns)

Public

+

Breakeven

+

+

Breakeven

+

TargSize

+

Both

+

+

Both

+

TargMktValue

+

Both

-

+

Both

- (ns)

Deal Size

-

Speed

-

-

Speed

- (ns)

Non-Friendly

-

Speed

-

-

Speed

- (ns)

Premium

+

Speed

-

+

Speed

-

DV
Propensity
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Table 8
Beta Coefficients, T-Statistics, and Significance Levels

Escape Motive
(versus firms w/ traditional motives)
Path
Coefficient

T-Staistic

TargSize

0.25

TargMktCap

Degree Inst. Ch.
(full sample)

Significance
Level

Path
Coefficient

3.51

0.001

0.11

1.87

AggBook

-0.09

AggMarket

Degree Inst. Ch.
(for firms w/ escape motives)

T-Staistic

Significance
Level

Path Coefficient

T-Staistic

Significance
Level

0.23

2.79

0.01

0.58

4.56

0.001

0.05

-0.10

3.77

0.001

-0.23

2.32

0.05

2.07

0.05

-0.01

0.61

ns

0.05

1.75

0.05

-0.12

2.36

0.05

0.04

1.75

0.05

0.10

1.33

0.10

TargIntAss

-0.14

1.24

ns

0.06

0.60

ns

0.03

0.17

ns

Deal Size

-0.12

2.71

0.01

-0.10

1.75

0.05

-0.13

1.94

0.05

Public

-0.09

1.24

ns

-0.04

0.63

ns

0.19

2.50

0.01

Non-Friendly

-0.09

1.49

0.10

-0.10

2.01

0.05

-0.17

2.77

0.01

Premium

0.12

1.59

0.10

-0.14

1.65

0.10

-0.49

5.09

0.001

DV

(table continues)
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Table 8 (Continued)
Beta Coefficients, T-Statistics, and Significance Levels

Degree Inst. Ch.
(for firms w/ traditional motives)

Degree Inst. Ch.
(subgroup difference)

Path Coefficient

T-Staistic

Significance
Level

Path Coefficient

T-Statistic

Significance
Level

TargSize

0.13

1.13

ns

0.46

2.49

0.01

TargMktCap

-0.08

1.03

ns

-0.15

1.06

ns

AggBook

-0.13

2.69

0.01

0.18

3.45

0.001

AggMarket

0.02

0.78

ns

0.08

0.84

ns

TargIntAss

0.07

0.36

ns

-0.04

0.16

ns

Deal Size

-0.11

1.06

ns

-0.02

0.18

ns

Public

-0.18

1.21

ns

0.37

2.45

0.01

Non-Friendly

-0.09

1.10

ns

-0.08

0.80

ns

Premium

0.15

1.82

0.05

-0.65

4.66

0.001

DV
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Support for the notion that escape happens, and is a genuine and legitimate OFDI
motive, is quite strong. Regarding support for the effects of escape motives on deal
characteristics, support in terms of statistical significance is wide, but effect sizes for
some DVs are small. In other words, it is possible that escape motives do not negate
economic fundamentals or rational analysis, but instead affect decisions at the margin.
Thus, nearly every relationship I examine is statistically significant, but with several
modest effect sizes.
One likely reason for the relatively small effect sizes of some DVs is the fact that
my research design accounted for the most prominent established antecedents (related to
home firm, industry, country, and temporal effects). Thus, it is possible that these
presented r-squared figures may actually resemble incremental changes in explained
variance had control variables been explicitly, statistically modeled. Viewed in this light,
effect sizes are quite comparable to similarly published JIBS studies.
Ultimately, of the 28 hypotheses I proposed, 24 were in the predicted direction
(18 statistically significant), while 4 were in the opposite direction (2 statistically
significant).
Qualitative follow up studies that enable scholars to examine stated (vs. revealed)
decision rationales may provide further evidence for my proposed reasoning behind each
hypothesis. This may also shed light as to whether my speculated reasons for why
coefficients for premiums and market cap had signs in the opposite of the predicted
direction. Also, as my research design controlled for firm differences (such as
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experience), follow up studies with different research designs may instead check to see if
they matter in this context (e.g., experience with Country A or Industry X might mean
quicker deals there).
Another interesting line of future research entails a closer examination of
relationships between escape-based FDI and traditional FDI motives. For example, P3
suggests that varying degrees of institutional degradation at home serves as the impetus
for escape-based FDI. Escape motives that prompt decisions to internationalize may
ultimately transform into (say) asset-exploitation based, market-seeking FDI. In other
words, escape motives, rather than being a rival motive, may actually serve as an
antecedent of traditional motives.
It is my hope that I have made a convincing case for a shift in relative emphasis
towards institutional studies based on degrees of alignment between goals of the firm and
the setting they operate in (specifically including home-country settings), as opposed to
the reflexive focus on either distance or host country attributes. I also hope that I have
made convincing case that a fifth FDI motive, escape-based FDI, deserves a place at the
table along with the four established motives.
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